



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

BS

2652

.B15

STORAGE

J1 d 5

The University of Chicago

FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

B 449435

DOES HELLENISM CONTRIBUTE CONSTITUENT  
ELEMENTS TO PAUL'S CHRISTOLOGY

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE DIVINITY  
SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.

DEPA.


NEW TESTAMENT LITERATURE AND INTERPRETATION

BY WILLIAM BAILEY

CHICAGO

Press of Geo. K. Hazlett & Co.

1906



BS  
2652  
.B15

**DOES HELLENISM CONTRIBUTE CONSTITUENT  
ELEMENTS TO PAUL'S CHRISTOLOGY.**



**The University of Chicago**

FOUNDED BY JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER

---

**DOES HELLENISM CONTRIBUTE CONSTITUENT  
ELEMENTS TO PAUL'S CHRISTOLOGY**

**A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE DIVINITY  
SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY.**

**DEPARTMENT OF NEW TESTAMENT LITERATURE AND INTERPRETATION**

---

**BY  
JOHN WILLIAM BAILEY**

---

**CHICAGO  
Press of Geo. K. Hallitt & Co.  
1905**

**COPYRIGHT, 1905**  
**THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

### *Introduction.*

1. General point of view.
  - a. Paul's relation to Palestinian Judaism.
  - b. Relation to primitive Christianity.
2. Specific elements.
  - a. Those of Judaism and primitive Jewish Christianity.
  - b. Some whose relation to Hellenistic thought must be investigated.

### I. SECOND ADAM.

1. Exposition of Paul's thought.
2. Origin of Paul's thought.
  - a. Exposition of Philo: relation of Paul and Philo as to
    - (1) Concept.
    - (2) Term.
  - b. Palestinian Jewish thought: the elements which it contributes.
  - c. Paul's experience.

### II. PRE-EXISTENCE.

1. Exposition of Paul's doctrine.
  - a. Classification and discussion of passages.
2. Origin of Paul's doctrine.
  - a. Primitive Christianity.
  - b. Greek conceptions.
  - c. Jewish thought.
  - d. Paul's experience.
3. Peculiar features.

### III. COSMIC FUNCTION.

1. New question: the sources.
2. Classification and exposition of passages.
3. Origin of Paul's conception.
  - a. Hellenistic conceptions.
  - b. Jewish and primitive Christian.
  - c. Paul's experience.

### IV. CONCLUSION.

Rec. M. V. 11-29-39





## INTRODUCTION.

---

In seeking to answer the question investigated in this essay it is advisable to get the right point of view from which to consider Paul's constructive thinking. In the matter of other New Testament writers the problem is not so difficult. No one would e. g., inquire with any seriousness whether Hellenistic thought had entered constructively into the synoptic gospels. On the other hand, no one can seriously doubt that it has influenced largely the epistle to the Hebrews and probably the fourth gospel. In the case of Paul, however, there is room for investigation. By birth he was a Hellenistic Jew, by training a Palestinian, and the question as to the influences which entered constructively into his thought becomes legitimate and natural.

If we interrogate the apostle through his writings we have not long to wait for an answer as respects that which was most fundamental.

He takes pains to tell us several times (Gal. 1:14; 2 Cor. 11:22; Phil. 3:5; cf. Acts 23:6) that he was one of the most zealous adherents to the traditions of his fathers as they were handed down by the Palestinian Rabbis that could be found among all his countrymen. He was blameless in his life as a Pharisee, was more exceedingly zealous than many of his own age, and was a persecutor of the Christian church because of his zeal for that which he had learned in the Rabbinic schools. It would do violence to the apostle's own testimony to make him fundamentally a representative of Hellenistic rather than of Pharisaic Judaism.

But the incidental testimony of his own writings is even stronger in its indication of the apostle's central standpoint. No one will question that the letters of Paul ally themselves in general point of view with Palestinian Judaism. The intense regard for the law and the strenuous endeavor to observe its precepts which Gal. 2:15ff, and Rom. 7 show to have been characteristic of pre-Christian Saul, were impossible except to a Pharisee of the Pharisees. Philo, it is true, indicates that there was in Hellenistic Judaism a difference in point of view concerning the binding character of the law. But, according to the same representation, Philo was himself one of those who held that it was not to be abrogated. But that Philo could in any wise be classed with the Pharisees or could have written of his own struggles to keep the law as Paul has done cannot be seriously thought of. Philo the Hellenistic legalist, and Saul the Pharisee, are as far apart as the east and the west.

Another point in which Paul is clearly in line with Palestinian thought is his general Messianic expectation. The difference between Hellenistic and Palestinian Judaism on this subject is even more marked than on the point just considered. The role which the Messiah played in the expectation, its general catastrophic character involving the resurrection of the righteous at least and eternal punishment of the wicked; the world judgment in which the Messiah as the representative of Jehovah, or Jehovah himself, sat on the throne and rewarded men according to their deeds, all these belong to Palestinian Judaism and are carried over into the Christian thought of Paul. In contrast with this we have in the Hellenistic writers who reflect the messianic ideal at all, little more than a hope for the restoration of the Dispersion to Jerusalem, and a rehabilitation and purgation of the land. In so far as a Messiah appears at all he is regarded simply as a leader appointed from the community to direct the people. This, it is true, is very similar to the hope of the Zealots in Palestine itself. But the general view of Paul is not that of the Zealots, or even of the popular expectation, but is most closely allied with that of the Apocalyptists.

If, now, Paul occupied the same general position as the most advanced Palestinian thought, he also was closely connected with primitive Christianity. Although his thought represents an advance beyond anything to be discovered in Jewish Christian writers, there is ample evidence that in the beginning he was in close connection with it. The struggle which he had with Jewish Christianity was not in reference to any Christological problems. Both he and the Jewish Christians held essentially, in the beginning at least, the same view concerning the positive work of Christ. The point at which they differed was as to the implication of that work of Christ concerning the old legal system. For both, Jesus was the Messiah, the bringer of life to his followers, the representative of God, and had been appointed both Lord and Christ. To the Jewish Christian who had not tested thoroughly the legalistic conception of religion, and had not thought through the significance of Christ's activity, the old legal system seemed binding. Paul himself had received from the primitive church the teaching that Christ died for sins according to the Scriptures (1 Cor. 15:3) and had been raised again, and his earliest preaching seems to have placed the emphasis upon these facts. But he knew, as he thought the matter to the bottom, that the legalistic system had been utterly done away in Christ. If it was still binding then Christ had died in vain (Gal. 2:21). Thus on the questions investigated in this essay there seems no reason for saying that Paul represents anything more than an advance over Jewish Christianity. He evidently started from the same general position, and he worked farther through the problem

because of the conditions which he had to face and the natural ability and the training which he brought to bear upon the task. (See more fully below, p. 54.)

While, then, Paul, by training and tradition, occupied the general point of view of Palestinian Judaism and primitive Jewish Christianity, we must also remember that his opportunities for making the acquaintance of Hellenistic thought were large. He was born and spent his early years in Tarsus, itself a great commercial metropolis, and one of the centers of Greek philosophy, full of the devotees of learning and the home of several of the most noted teachers of Stoicism. According to the testimony of Strabo (Book XIV, 5, 13-15), it surpassed even Athens and Alexandria "and every other place which can be named where there are schools and lectures of philosophy." In this atmosphere Paul was reared. The Jews in all probability had their own quarter of the city as was the custom in the cities of the Empire<sup>1</sup>, but Paul's father being a Roman citizen as well as a citizen of Tarsus (Acts 16:27; 22:26-28) was most probably a man of wealth and position. For according to Dio Chrysostom (ARNIM'S ED. I, p. 321) most of the inhabitants of the city were outside of citizenship and a certain fortune was required to attain it. There can be little doubt that Paul mingled freely with the best people of the city and was in daily contact with the Greek speaking population, for it is highly probable that a family with the rank and standing of Paul's would cast off its Jewish exclusiveness (SEE DIO CHRYSOSTOM, ARNIM'S ED. I, p. 302; p. 321). Especially would this be true if, as Ramsay has suggested, Paul's father was connected with the administration of the government. This would by no means necessitate a waning of zeal for Jewish traditions. There is no evidence that he attended Greek schools here, and the fact that at an early age (Acts 26:4, 5) he was sent to Jerusalem to study in the Rabbinic schools (Acts 22:3) strongly suggests that his parents were sufficiently zealous of the traditions to have given him in the synagogue school such training as he may have previously received. Otherwise, he would scarcely have been prepared for his duties at Jerusalem. If he went to Jerusalem at the usual early age he can hardly have had opportunity to learn very much of Greek thought in Tarsus in his boyhood. Of course his studies at Jerusalem were not connected with Hellenistic thought.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>JOSEPHUS, *Ant.* XII. 1, 7; XIV. 3, 2; *War.* II. 18, 2; *con. Ap.* II. 4; cf. SCHURER, *Gemeindeverfassung* etc., and RAMSAY, *Exp.* 1902, pp. 19-32; 92-109. But see PHILO, *ad Flaccum*, 8.

<sup>2</sup>SCHIELE, *Z. W. TH.* 1899, p. 31, suggests that Paul was one of the five hundred pupils of Gamaliel who, according to Jewish traditions, gave themselves to the study of Greek philosophy and literature. Even LIGHTFOOT, *Bib.*

After his conversion Paul spent some years in the province of Syria-Cilicia. Zahn (*Einleitung*, Vol. I, p. 37) has suggested that Paul knowing that he was to be the apostle to the gentiles spent at least a part of this time in preparation for his task by acquainting himself with Greek philosophical and rhetorical learning (cf. I Cor. 9:19-23). This is the opinion of various scholars (e. g. FINDLAY, *Art. Paul*, *Hastings Dict. of the Bible*; RAMSAY, *St. Paul*, etc., pp. 353-356; and very emphatically KÖSTERS, *St. und Kr.* 1854, p. 307; and GODET, *Int. to the Pauline Epp.* pp. 70-71) but the evidence points rather in another direction. It would be difficult to state more clearly than Paul has done in Gal. 1:23 that at least a part of this time was devoted to the work of spreading the gospel. If to this be added two passages in Acts there would seem to remain little room for question as to how he was occupied during this period. It appears from Acts 15:41 that at the time of the second missionary journey there were churches in Syria-Cilicia which had been founded some time, perhaps years before, and in all probability were due to the labors of Paul (see Rom. 15:20-22; cf. II Cor. 10:13ff, also Acts 15:23). In the early days of the church at Antioch when it was brought under the surveillance of the church at Jerusalem, Barnabas who had been sent from Jerusalem to Antioch "went forth to Tarsus to seek for Saul" (Acts 11:25, 26). It seems very clear that the report of Paul, such e. g. as is implied in Gal. 1:23, had reached Antioch. It is further implied by the whole context of Acts 11:25, 26 that the work of Paul as a missionary and a preacher of the gospel was well known and highly valued. This could scarcely have been true if he had not been largely engaged in such work. Since this coming of Paul to Antioch must, by any chronology, have been as early as 44 A. D. it would not allow any great length of time after Paul's conversion and his return to Syria-Cilicia for him to engage in other activities (cf. B. WEISS, *Einleitung*, p. 115, Eng. tr. I, 157) as he did not reach there until about four years after his conversion. Thus the facts of Paul's life so far as they are ascertainable are distinctly opposed to the supposition that he had any special training in Hellenistic thought. It is rather suggested that his knowledge of Hellenistic life and thought came from his incidental personal association and daily contact with it. Throughout his missionary career he was constantly in territory in which he must almost every day have been aware of the great difference in mental life and possession between himself and those by whom he was surrounded. The difference in his conception of heathenism as reflected in Gal. 4:8-10, I Cor. 12:2 and Rom. 1:18ff, respectively, seems clearly to show progression in his understanding

*Essays*, p. 205, thinks that Gamaliel would have encouraged Paul "not to neglect Greek culture." This is all pure *phantasie*.

of it and his appreciation of its condition. That he made any conscious effort to acquaint himself with gentile thought and to incorporate it in his system seems pretty clearly contradicted by the second chapter of the first Corinthian letter. His adaptation to the thought against which he utters his polemic in Colossians is forced upon him by the circumstances which he had to meet.

We discover then no *a priori* probability that Hellenism contributed largely to the apostle's thought. He was essentially a Pharisaic Jew in close sympathy with much of primitive Jewish Christian thought and quite out of line with the great movements of Hellenistic Judaism.<sup>8</sup> But the question as to whether Hellenistic thought entered into his constructive Christological thinking is simply a question of evidence and must not be prejudged.

This can be decided only by a discussion of the elements of Paul's Christology as they appear in his letters.

There are certain features of his Christological thought in which without any question he is working along purely Jewish lines. The conception of Jesus as Christ, which in fact is the great central element of his thought, is of course purely Jewish. His conception of that Christ as a sacrifice for the sins of men, as the savior of men from the wrath of God and the guarantee to them of his final approval, is in direct continuation of Jewish thought, though in some respects going far beyond it. His conception of Christ as the son of God is also in direct relation to Jewish and primitive Christian thought. He may have thought of the basis of this sonship in a way different from that in which it was conceived by either Judaism or the primitive church, but the term expressing, the content of sonship, does not depart widely from them. His designation of Christ as Lord is with him a purely religious term, the correlate of which is *δοῦλος* by which term he expresses his complete subjection to the will of Christ. This conception of the lordship of Christ is also directly in line with the best Jewish thought in general, and with the thought of the early church as reflected in Acts in particular.

While there are thus certain elements which no one can question as being Jewish, there are certain others which call for more extended consideration. His doctrine of the heavenly Christ, the

---

<sup>8</sup>The essay of Canon Hicks, *Studia Biblica*, Vol. IV., pp. 1-13, on "St. Paul and Hellenism" seems generally accepted, among English writers at least, as representing the proper point of view with respect to Paul's relation to Hellenism. It seems to me to represent for the most part a vivid piece of fancy. He thinks, e. g., that Paul is Hellenic in his ethics inasmuch as "(1) they rest upon a principle, life in Christ, and (2) he is logical in the classification of virtues." Even more groundless is his notion that in fighting for the universality of the gospel, Paul was really working out a principle of Hellenism. I wonder if Jesus was doing the same.

pre-existent one in the form of God, his relation to the origin, the history and the consummation of the cosmos, and his incarnation, present elements of his thought which are by many claimed, and with plausibility it must be said, to be expressions of the influence of Hellenism upon his thinking. These and other elements may be grouped around the three conceptions, Second Adam, Pre-existence, and Cosmic Function and these must now be investigated.

## I.

### THE SECOND ADAM.

In three well-known passages (Rom. 5:12-21; I Cor. 15:20-23; I Cor. 15:45-49) Paul brings Adam and Christ into very striking relation. In the first and second of these he elaborates with clearness and definiteness the antithetic parallelism between the sin of Adam and the death of Christ as they respectively affect the destiny of mankind. Both passages present essentially the same antithesis, but the apostle's thought is exhibited in the first with much greater fulness and clearness. The third passage deals with the same general antithesis of Adam and Christ, but in the designation of the latter as the "last Adam," the "second man" the apostle exhibits an element of thought which is not definitely expressed in either of the other two passages. They must, however, be considered in the attempt to attain a true appreciation of the thought which the third passage contains.

Recent scholars of different schools have accorded this conception of the "second Adam" a central place in Pauline thought. Beyschlag (*New Testament Theology*, Vol. II, pp. 48-88) seized upon it as the key to Paul's Christology, and Bovon (*Theologie du Nouveau Testament*, Vol. II, pp. 253-75) is largely controlled by the same conception. Somerville in his recent monograph (*St. Paul's Conception of Christ: The Cunningham Lectures, 1897*), though working on lines differing from Beyschlag, presents a very elaborate statement of the apostle's Christology, with this antithesis as the point of departure. Holtzmann (*Lehrbuch der Neutestamentlichen Theologie*, p. 55) regards it as the "metaphysical background" for Paul's Christology, and Holsten (*Zum Evangelium des Paulus und Petrus*, p. 71ff) even ventured the opinion that the metaphysical conception of the heavenly man here involved was a *sine qua non* of the "Christus-vision" which resulted in the conversion of Paul.

The importance which scholars of so widely varying view points agree in attaching to the conception, the different interpretations given to it and the opinions which are held concerning its origin, bespeak for it a leading place in the present investigation. Accordingly the discovery of the thought which underlies the designation of Christ as the "second Adam," and the origin of the conception, constitute the first problem of this paper.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>The method to be pursued in this entire investigation is obviously one of two alternatives. On the one hand, we may assume the origin of the apostle's



The entire passage (I Cor. 15:45-49) with which we have first to deal, reads as follows:

οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν· ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν. ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικόν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν. ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς χοϊκός, ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. οἷος ὁ χοϊκός, τοιοῦτοι οἱ χοϊκοί, καὶ οἷος ὁ ἐπουράνιος, τοιοῦτοι οἱ ἐπουράνιοι· καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, [φορέσωμεν]· καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου.

The contrast which Paul here institutes may be schematically represented thus:

- Verse 45. The first Adam became living soul.  
The last Adam became life-giving spirit.
- Verse 46. First the psychic.  
Then the pneumatic.
- Verse 47. First man of earth, earthy.  
Second man of heaven (heavenly, verse 48).
- Verse 48. Earthy (natural) men like him.  
Heavenly (raised) men like him.
- Verse 49. We now bear his image.  
We shall (after resurrection) bear his image.

It is apparent from a careful reading of Paul's language that the contrast between the "first" and "second Adam" is not presented for its own sake, but for the bearing which it has upon the question to which he is addressing himself, the character of the resurrection body. In verse 35 he has proposed the rhetorical question, "How are the dead raised, with what body do they come?" Verses 36-43 are intended to lead up to the answer to this question which he offers in verse 44. He there declares that being sown a psychic or natural body it is raised a pneumatic body. In anticipation of the objection that there is no ground for supposing that a pneumatic

thought, and interpret it in accordance with the conception reflected in the source from which it is supposed to be drawn. But this would be a gross *petitio principii* and is wholly unwarranted. On the other hand, we may endeavor to discover by an interpretation of the apostle's statements the general positions which, independently of their origin, are with certainty attested as his; and then, before passing final judgment, inquire after their antecedents, with a view to a deeper understanding or a more intelligent appreciation of the thought already attained. This is certainly the only true method and the one we shall attempt to follow.

\*The brackets are Westcott and Horts. Weiss supported by B reads φορέσωμεν. The internal evidence of the passage strongly favors this reading.

body exists, he replies that analogy suggests its existence. If, as no one questions ( εἰ ἔστιν ) there exists the psychic body, the logical inference is that there exists also a pneumatic body ( ἔστιν καὶ ); and furthermore, (καὶ) this logical presumption is supported (not proved) by the scripture itself (οὕτως γέγραπται). Then immediately follow the words of verse 45 which present to us the conception of the "second Adam" whose meaning we are now seeking to resolve. The remainder of the paragraph, verses 46-49, is part of a larger argument but is quite important in helping to arrive at the thought of verse 45.

It should be noted that the passage is introduced apparently as a quotation from the Old Testament.<sup>6</sup> The obvious basis for it is to be found in the LXX of Gen. 2:7, but it is not infrequently maintained that Paul has in mind also the passage in Gen. 1:27. (So HAUSRATH, *Times of the Apostles*, III, pp. 95-111; HOLSTEN, *Evangelium des Paulus*, Vol. I, *in loco*. Cf. PFLEIDERER, *Paulinism*, English translation, p. 117ff, and SCHMIEDEL *Hand-Kommentar, Excursus*, p. 168). For this position however there is no support. The only point in the entire passage in which there is even a possible suggestion of Gen. 1:27, is in verse 49, which contains the word εἰκόνα. A closer scrutiny of this verse, however, indicates that it is Gen. 5:3 rather than 1:27, which the apostle has in mind. In the first part of the verse he is thinking of man's relation to Adam, and in the second part, of his relation to Christ. In neither is there a direct reference to the nature of Christ or to his relation to God, such as the inclusion of Gen. 1:27 would involve. To regard 1:27 as included in the quotation is not only a pure gratuity but virtually a begging of the question. For it cannot be shown to be reflected except on the assumption that the apostle's conception includes a contrast between the man of Gen. 1:27 and that of 2:7. This assumption involves the question under consideration.

How much of the passage is regarded by the apostle as a part of the quotation? It is maintained by some (e. g. HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.* p. 55, note 1, and p. 76; FEINE, *Das Gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus*, pp. 34, 35; HOLSTEN, *Evangelium des Paulus*, Vol. I, p. 432, II, p. 40; and VOLLMER, *Alttestamentliche Citate*, p. 54) that he intends to include the whole verse. The evidence, however, rather tends to show that he did not consider it to extend beyond ζῶσαν (Cf. HEINRICI, EDWARDS, GODET, *ad loc.*). Such a quotation would not only be contrary to fact but would not speak well for the intelligence of the apostle or his readers. In addition to this he seems

<sup>6</sup>The consideration of this fact is an apparent but not real violation of the method adopted above and is rendered necessary by the express words of the passage itself.

to have distinctly recognized the verbal inadequacy of the text of the original passage, for into it he inserts two words. The *πρῶτος* which he places just before *ἄνθρωπος* was, as will be clearly shown below, taken over from current Judaism and was intended to balance the *ἔσχατος* of the next clause. The *Ἀδάμ* which immediately follows *ἄνθρωπος* is its Hebrew equivalent, and balances the same word in the next clause. Both these words are introduced to give point to the antithesis respecting Adam and Christ, which Paul intends to exhibit (cf. BENGEL, HEINRICI, EDWARDS and GODET *ad loc.*). By neither of these additions does the apostle do violence to the thought of the original passage, and the procedure is quite in accordance with the interpretative method of the time. (cf. note 7. *fin.*)

Can we regard the second part of the verse (45) as an interpretative addition to the original text and thus explain the conception of the "second Adam"? This is virtually the position of those (e. g. VOLLMER, *op. cit.* p. 54; JOWETT, *Commentary on Thessalonians, Galatians and Romans*, Vol. I, p. 145; and THACKERAY, *The Relation of Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, p. 47) who think that the apostle derived the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιού*nas predicated of the "last Adam," from the words *πνοήν ζωῆς* in the original passage. This position can hardly be said to be a plausible one even on the supposition that the text of the Septuagint which Paul used read *πνεῦμα ζωῆς* instead of *πνοήν ζωῆς*. The evidence for this is but slight, being found chiefly in Philo and even this is weak.<sup>7</sup> In either case it is hardly probable that the apostle would find a reference to the "second man" in a statement which in the original text is not only expressly referred to the "first man," but also forms the

<sup>7</sup>In *leg. alleg.* III. 55; and *quod det. pot. insid.* 22 he reads *πνεῦμα ζωῆς* but in *de plant.* 5; *de somno*, I. 6; *leg. alleg.* I. 12; *de opif. mundi*, 46; *de mundo*, 4; *quis rer. div. her.*, II, he reads *πνοήν ζωῆς*. In *leg. alleg.* I. 13 *fin.* he bases an argument on the fact that Moses uses *πνοήν* and not *πνεῦμα*. Symmachus and Theodotion read *ἀναπνοήν ζωῆς*. Cf. Philo, *quod det. pot. insid.* 22, *ὅτι πνεῦμα ἔστιν ἡ ψυχῆς οὐσία*. See further HATCH, *Essays in Biblical Greek*, pp. 147-49. Notwithstanding the opinion of Hatch "the hypothesis that the two readings coexisted in the earliest forms of the Septuagint" derives but little support from Wisdom 15:11, which combines the two readings of Philo as follows:

*ὅτι ἡγγόνησε τὸν πλάσαντα αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν ἐμπνεύσαντα αὐτῷ ψυχὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν καὶ ἐμφυσήσαντα πνεῦμα ζωτικόν.*

Josephus, *Ant.* I. 1:2 (Niese I. 24), gives essentially the same combination. But a comparison of this quotation of Josephus with the one from Gen. 2:1-3 in the preceding paragraph makes it clear that the addition to the original text is abundantly explained on other grounds. He seems to have incorporated into the original passage which he quotes his understanding of its meaning and to have given it as a part of the quotation.

connecting link between two statements, which even on the hypothesis in question he, in agreement with the original passage, refers to the "first man." Nor is there more ground for the position which Vollmer (*op. cit.* pp. 54, 55) attributes to Schöttgen, according to which Paul derived the "first Adam" from *πρωτὴν ζώης* and the "second Adam" from *ψυχὴν ζώσαν*. This is in direct opposition to the apostle's own statement.

There seems then sufficient ground for holding that the second half of the verse (45) is intended neither as a part of the quotation nor as an interpretative addition to it. Its meaning is not to be discovered from an interpretation of the Old Testament passage, but must be derived from the language of the apostle himself. In the attempt to attain it we cannot do better than consider the successive predicates by which he characterizes the "second Adam" and the steps in which he exhibits his thought.

In the first place the relation of the two Adams is suggested by the very terms which are used to designate them. The "last Adam" is Christ, the "first Adam" is the father of the race. Heinrici well says that this would be a mere riddle of speech if the "last Adam" were conceived to be historically *first*. He must by the very terms of the thought be subsequent to the historical Adam. (Cf. HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, p. 76). The attempt has been made by various writers (e. g. BEYSCHLAG, *op. cit.*, p. 88; WEISS, *Biblical Theology*, Vol. I, p. 410f; PFLEIDERER, *Paulinism*, Vol. I, p. 133) to explain this by saying that Paul started in thought with the historical and the exalted Christ and went back to the pre-existent Christ and so he was historically second. But this is fallacious reasoning. If the apostle, from whatever point he started, had in the center of his thought at this point the pre-existent Christ, and had forgotten the historical Christ, he could scarcely have designated him as subsequent to the historical Adam. And if the thought of the historical Christ so controlled his conception as to render it natural to speak of him as subsequent to the historical Adam (as must be held by those whose view I am criticizing), it is difficult to see how this differs from the idea that it was the historical Christ of whom he was thinking and whom he thus characterized. No reason, except a dogmatic one, exists for denying this.

But the first predicate used of the "second Adam" helps us to get nearer his thought. In designating him as a life-giving spirit Paul can only be thinking of the risen Christ. It is only Christ exalted to the right hand of the Father to whom he applies the term spirit<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>HOLSTEN, *Evangelium des Paulus*, Vol. I, p. 432, says "because God is spirit (that is, life giving) so as the image of God the 'second Adam' is life giving." Cf. HOLTZMANN *op. cit.* p. 76 and note 2.

(II Cor. 3:17, 18. Cf. Rom. 5:9-11; 8:10, 11). According to the most probable interpretation this is true even of Romans 1:4. He speaks of the historical Christ in very different terms (II Cor. 13:4; Rom. 8:3; Phil. 2:7). Moreover the ζωοποιῶν indicates that it was at the resurrection that Christ was conceived to have acquired this character of a life-giving spirit, (cf. vs. 22) as most interpreters (even Pfeiderer and Holtzmann) now agree<sup>9</sup>. The prevailing usage of this term in the New Testament connects it with the resurrection of the dead. It is used seven times in Paul and in four instances clearly has such a reference (Rom. 4:17; 8:11; I Cor. 15:22, 36. See also Gal. 3:21). In three out of the four remaining instances in which it is used in the New Testament, it agrees with the prevailing usage in Paul, the other one being of too general a character to be of value in deciding its meaning. From its prevailing meaning in Paul as well as its indubitable relation to verse 22 (cf. vs. 20) there is no doubt that it refers to the power of Christ to bring the dead to life. The entire chapter bases this power upon the fact of his own resurrection. (See especially vss. 12ff. Cf. I Thess. 4:14; I Cor. 6:14; II Cor. 4:14; Rom. 5:10; 6:4ff, 8, 9; 10:9; Phil. 3:10, 20, 21; Eph. 1:20).

As if to make it perfectly clear that he had this conception in mind Paul lays it down as a general principle; τὸ . . . τὸ (cf. FEINE, *Das Gesetzesfreie Evangelium des Paulus*, p. 42) that the pneumatic does not precede the psychic, but on the contrary the psychic is first and the pneumatic follows (verse 46). This he has at least implied in verse 45, but he now affirms it in language which places his thought in this respect beyond doubt.

The occasion for introducing this statement by an adversative (ἀλλ') rather than by a continuative conjunction is not easily determined. It is at least probable that he intends expressly to oppose some view well known to his readers in which the consecution of psychic and pneumatic was held in the order the reverse of that given here. Remembering that this passage was written from Ephesus to Corinth it seems natural to find a controversial reference to either the pure Greek conception of Platonism or to the hybrid thought of Alexandria (so EDWARDS, THACKERAY, FEINE), which may have been fairly familiar in this region (cf. Acts 18:24). It is not impossible that the same type of thought which occasioned the writing of this chapter on the resurrection, contained elements of thought also which are here repudiated by the apostle. In the light of the conditions reflected in the first four chapters of the epistle, this seems quite probable. Whatever specific view may be opposed,

<sup>9</sup>Edwards refers it to the incarnation and Godet has it a process beginning with the incarnation and ending with the resurrection.

it seems important to bear in mind two things, (1) that the statement is a general one, and (2) that it distinctly repudiates the conception which makes the pneumatic precede the psychic. In speaking of the psychic he has particular reference to the present historical dispensation as opposed to the future time (cf. GUNKEL, *Die Wirkungen des Heiligen Geistes*, p. 65) after the resurrection. This thought follows also from the comparisons contained in verses 48 and 49. For, he says, just as we have borne the image of the earthly Adam in the present life so also in the future life we shall bear the image of the heavenly man, since those who are earthly are like the earthly man and those who are heavenly are like the heavenly. (Cf. Phil. 3:20, 21; Col. 3:1-4). It is Christ who is risen from the dead the first fruits of those who shall be raised (verse 20) whose image we shall bear.

This interpretation is not contradicted by the fact that the "second man" is said to be of heaven (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ verse 47). (*Contra* BEYSCHLAG, *op. cit.*, p. 78; WEISS, *op. cit.*, p. 410; EDWARDS, *ad. loc.*). ἐξ οὐρανοῦ neither indicates that the "second man" is to come from heaven at the parousia (MEYER, GODET, *in loco*; MILLIGAN, *The Resurrection*, pp. 181-89) nor that as a pre-existent being he had his abode in heaven whence he came to earth. Of the numerous cases in which the phrase occurs in the New Testament writings, the majority, it is true, is clearly of spacial significance. But there is a respectable minority in which the phrase describes heaven not as a place from which a given person or thing proceeds, but as the source of its authority or its character, the emphasis being not so much on the source idea as on the character or authority thus derived (see e. g. Matt. 16:1, 21:25; Mark 11:30; Luke 20:4, 5). This is a well established usage also for other phrases composed of ἐκ and a noun (e. g. John 8:43; I Cor. 15:40; Rom. 2:8; Phil. 1:17; and especially John 3:21, 8:47). It is thus quite clear that ἐξ οὐρανοῦ is not a phrase which uniformly connotes the idea of spacial origin.

But there are two passages of particular importance for the understanding of this phrase. The first is in Luke 11:13 where God is described as ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. Now it would be absurd to suppose that the term here means spacial point of departure or origin in any sense. The practical equivalent of the phrase is found in various passages in the gospel of Matt. (e. g. 5:48; 6:14, 26; 6:42; 15:13; 18:35; 23:9) where God is characterized by the adjective οὐράνιος (In Matt. 18:35 it is ἐπουράνιος). Both the phrase and the adjective seem intended to set forth the same idea as that expressed in the phrase ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ or οὐρανοῖς by which God is described. (See e. g. Matt. 5:45; 6:1; 6:9; 7:11; 7:21; 18:14, 21). The second passage is II Cor. 5:2, where Paul speaks of the body awaiting him

in heaven, as τὸ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. No one who knows Jewish thought on this subject, can for a moment doubt that the apostle conceives of the body with which he expects to be clothed upon, as already existing in heaven and set apart awaiting his coming. Here again the phrase is the practical equivalent of the adjective οὐράνιος.

When now we look closely at the present passage we see that whereas the phrase ἐκ γῆς is followed by the adjective χοϊκός, the phrase ἐξ οὐρανοῦ stands alone in the first clause, the ἐπουράνιος being omitted. This is significant. It seems to clearly show that ἐξ οὐρανοῦ is the correlate, not of ἐκ γῆς but of χοϊκός and that ἐπουράνιος in the next sentence is an alternative expression of equivalent sense. This we have already seen to be true in other passages<sup>10</sup>.

Thus neither by usage nor by the parallelism of thought in the present passage is ἐξ οὐρανοῦ defined as a phrase denoting *source from which*, and the exposition of the passage has shown that such an idea is foreign to the context.

Nor is it any objection to the above interpretation that it would make the ἐγένετο in the first member of verse 45 refer to an actual coming into being, but in the second member to a change from one form of existence to another. On the contrary it rather supports it as showing that the apostle affirmed not that the "last Adam *was* (ἦν) , but that he *became* (ἐγένετο) a life-giving spirit. And just as the ἐγένετο refers to the actual beginning of the first Adam so it designates the beginning of the "second Adam" as such Adam. (See HOLTZMANN, *op cit.*, p. 76). In any case ἐγένετο is not the prominent word, but it is simply the existence and character of the pneumatic body which is emphasized. We conclude then that in this passage Paul, in speaking of the "last Adam," the "second man," refers to the risen exalted Christ, who is now in heaven seated at the right hand of God, and who by his resurrection attained the character which is described by the term "last Adam."

But the contrast between Adam and Christ is not confined to this passage. As suggested in the beginning it is to be found also in verses 20-23 of this same chapter and in Rom. 5:12-21. The light which they reflect upon the particular point now under discussion is not inconsiderable. For our present purpose the two may be considered together. The argument of both is as follows. As a matter of historical fact which cannot be controverted Christ is risen from

---

<sup>10</sup>If it should still be insisted that the ἐξ οὐρανοῦ is the correlate of ἐκ γῆς it would not change the result of our interpretation. For ἐκ γῆς does not express the place from which the earthly man proceeds to some other place; hence the strictest parallelism does not suggest that ἐξ οὐρανοῦ denotes the place from which the "second man" came (to earth).

the dead and is the beginning and the promise (I Cor. 15:20) of the resurrection of all those who sleep in death. For since (The first is the ground of the second, cf. I Cor. 1:21, 22; 14:16; Phil. 2:26) death entered the world through man, that is through the sin of man (I Cor. 15:21; Rom. 5:12, 17), also through man, that is through the obedience of man (I Cor. 15:21; Rom. 5:17, 19), there shall come the resurrection (I Cor. 15:21), in which all those in Christ shall be made alive (I Cor. 15:22; Rom. 5:17, 18, 21). Christ is the first one (ἀπαρχή)... . ἔπειτα: Cf. II Thess. 2:13; I Cor. 16:15; Rom. 8:23; 11:16; 16:5; cf. SANDAY and WEISS, *in loco*) and those who belong to Him shall arise at His coming (I Cor. 15:23, cf. I Thess. 1:15, 16). As Adam himself first sinned (I Cor. 15:22; Rom. 12:14ff) and thus introduced death into the race so Christ, having been raised from the dead, forms a new start for the race, is the beginning and the sample (I Cor. 15:20, cf. Col. 1:18; and see ABBOTT *ad loc.* Cf. also *I Clement* 24; 42) of a new race who through him shall receive life and entrance into the kingdom (I Cor. 15:24; cf. I Thess. 1:10; Rom. 5:16, 17, 18-21). Adam is a type of Christ (Rom. 5:14), that is, just as Adam is the head of a race upon whom death has come because of sin (Rom. 5:12ff) so also is Christ the head of a new humanity (I Cor. 15:20, 21, 23; Rom. 5:14ff. Cf. WEISS *in loco*) to whom life comes because of His obedience and resurrection. Not in their absolute character then, but in the results for the human race of their respective conduct, are Adam and Christ contrasted. And just as the "first Adam," (I Cor. 15:45) himself psychical and earthy, is the head of a psychical race whose universal experience is death because its head sinned and brought death upon it (I Cor. 15:21; Rom. 5:12ff), so Christ himself pneumatic (I Cor. 15:46), the "second representative man," the heavenly man (verse 47), is by his resurrection the head of a new race; the antitype (Rom. 5:14) of the "first Adam."

Christ is not then eternally the "second man" or the "last Adam" who at his resurrection assumes a form of existence (cf. HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 76ff) by virtue of which he receives life-giving power, but it is only by virtue of his resurrection through which he is able to make alive (at the resurrection) those who accept him, that he becomes the head of a new humanity and in consequence receives the title of the "second man," the "last Adam." He is the "second (representative) man" since as a matter of historical fact he is the second beginner of the race. He is the "last Adam" inasmuch as in him humanity is to attain its goal.

Does the Philonean conception of the heavenly man form a constituent element of this conception? The passages which are usually referred to as its source by those who hold to its Philonean origin, (as e. g. SIEGFRIED, *Philo von Alexandria*, pp. 284, 308; HAUSRATH,



*New Testament Times: Time of the Apostles*, III, pp. 95-103; SCHIELE, *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1899, pp. 20-31; cf. further HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, p. 55) are two in number and read as follows.

*Leg. alleg.* I. 12. καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν λαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν. διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη. ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐράνιος ὁ δὲ γήινος. ὁ μὲν οὖν οὐράνιος ἅτα κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς φθαρτῆς καὶ συνόλως γεώδους οὐσίας ἀμέτοχος, ὁ δὲ γήινος ἐκ σποράδος ὕλης ἦν χοῦν κέκληκεν ἐπάγῃ· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὗτος γεώδης ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι καὶ φθαρτὸς εἰ μὴ ὁ θεὸς ἐμπνεύσειεν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς.

*De opif. mundi*, 46. μετὰ ταῦτά φησιν ὅτι ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν λαβὼν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς. ἐναργέστατα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παρίστησιν ὅτι διαφορὰ παμμεγέθυς ἐστὶ τοῦ τε νῦν πλασθέντος ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονότος πρότερον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς ἦδη μετέχων ποιήτητος, ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστὼς, . . . . ὅδε κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ἰδέα τις ἢ γένος ἢ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὗτ' ἄρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἀφθαρτὸς φύσει.

It is argued that these two passages show that Philo looked upon the first and second chapters of Gen. as respectively recording the creation of two distinct men or races of men (Cf. BOUSSET, *Die Religion des Judentums*, p. 347). The man of Gen. 2:7 is earthly. He is formed later in time than the man of Gen. 1:27 and is distinctly inferior to him. He represents the natural human race and is its progenitor. The man of Gen. 1:27 is the heavenly man, not "formed" but "made" according to the image of God. He is the *prototype* of the human race, the pattern or image according to which the human race is made, and antedates in time its progenitor. From other passages (e. g. *de plantatione* 5 and *de mundo* 3) it seems clear that he thinks of the *logos* as this prototype of man and image of God (*Contra*, DRUMMOND, *Philo*, Vol. II, p. 275).

Now the first passage seems at first sight to be inconsistent with itself if we allow it this meaning, for Philo immediately adds that the earthly man must be taken to be the mind (νοῦς) which is by nature corruptible until God imparts to it the power of true life. But the antithesis to νοῦς is not here expressed, and a closer examination of the passage shows that he probably thought of the νοῦς as antithetic not to some other part of the earthly man but to the νοῦς which is not "infused into a body," i. e. an unembodied mind

(*voûs*) the heavenly (unembodied) man. It seems also to be inconsistent with the third view stated below, which makes the mind (*voûs*) the part of the soul bearing the image of God. It may be explained by the statement of *de plantatione* 5, and *de mundo* 3. (See below). When, now, we turn to the second passage we find that it is not decisive on this point. While it is clear enough as a purely formal statement concerning the man "made of the dust of the ground" and the other formed "according to the image of God," it is quite ambiguous concerning the precise conception which Philo at this point had in mind. The statement that the man according to the image of God is neither male nor female may be intended in either a literal or figurative sense. Philo has elsewhere (*de opif. mundi*, 24) said that the first (earthly) man was androgynous, basing his interpretation on the Scripture language itself. (Gen. 1:27). His point of view in the present passage might be either ethical or psychological. But since he speaks of the man made according to the image of God as an idea or a seal, terms which he elsewhere applies to the logos, it seems true that he reflects at this point the thought usually assigned him.

In *de profugis* 13, 14, apparently the same conception appears. But it should be noticed that in this passage just as in those already considered the conception is not clear cut and distinct. For he speaks in 13 of the man made in the image of God as divided into two parts, one part of which is the "rational part within us" made by God himself, and the other that part (of the soul) which is to be kept in subjection made by the Powers to whom God assigns it; but in 14 he says of the part which God himself made that it is "reason destitute of species and free from all admixture." By this he apparently thinks of the archetypal man or *λόγος*.

It is misleading, however, to adduce these passages alone, as if they expressed the only opinion of Philo in reference to the relation of the two passages of Gen. In a long section in "*Questions and Answers*" I. 4, 8, the two men, one created according to the image of God and the other made of the dust of the ground, are again brought into contrast. In the first part of this passage, by the man "created in the image of God" he means the "archetypal model . . . the word of God, the first beginning of all things, the original species or archetypal idea," but in the latter part he means the virtuous man, the man who is in need of nothing but is "his own master by reason of his natural endowments." This latter conception is explicitly stated in *Quis rer. div. her.* II and 12.

ἐνεφύσησε γὰρ φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὄλων εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν. ἢ καὶ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ποιητοῦ λόγος ἔχει τυπωθῆναι. 12. ὥστε διττὸν εἶδος ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὲν θεῖον πνεύματι λογισμῷ βιούντων, τὸ δὲ αἵματι καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονῇ ζώντων, τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος ἐστὶ πλάσμα γῆς, ἐκείνο δὲ θείας εἰκόνας ἐμπερὲς ἐκμαγεῖον.

With the thought expressed in this passage agrees that of *Leg. alleg.* II 2; so also I 16. Two kinds or races of men are mentioned, one being said to have been made in the image of God, and the other fashioned out of the earth. The former is expressly declared to be the virtuous, the latter the wicked and reckless man. See also *de mutatione nominum* 4 (Wendland 31f).

Still another conception is to be found in *de opif. mundi*, 23; which reads:

μετὰ δὴ τάλλα πάντα καθάπερ ἐλέχθη, τὸν ἄνθρωπον φησι γεγενῆσθαι κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. . . τὴν δ' ἐμφέρειαν μηδεὶς εἰκαζέτω σώματος χαρακτήρι· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνθρωπόμορφος ὁ θεὸς οὔτε θεοειδὲς τὸ ἀπείρο πειο σῶμα· ἢ δὲ εἰκὼν λέλεκται κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμόνα νοῦν, πρὸς γὰρ ἕνα τὸν τῶν ὄλων ἐκείνον ὡς ἂν ἀρχέτυπον ὃ ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀπεικονίσθη. τρόπον τινὰ θεὸς ὢν τοῦ φέροντος καὶ ἀγαλματαφοροῦντος αὐτόν. ὃν γὰρ ἔχει λόγον ὁ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν ἅπαντι τῷ κόσμῳ, τοῦτον ὡς ἔοικε καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ.

The same conception occurs in *de plantatione*, 5.

ὁ δὲ μέγας Μωυσῆς οὐδενὶ τῶν γεγονότων τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος ὁμοίωσεν, ἀλλ' ἔλεπεν αὐτὴν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου πνεύματος ἐκείνου. δόκιμον εἶναι νόμισμα σημειωθὲν καὶ τυπωθὲν σφραγίδι θεοῦ, ἧς ὁ χαρακτήρ ἐστὶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐνέπνευσε γὰρ φησὶν ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς (*Gen.* 2-7) ὥστε ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὸν ἐκπέμποντα τὸν δεχόμενον ἀπεικονίσθαι. διὰ καὶ λέγεται κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγενῆσθαι (*Gen.* 1-27) οὐ μὴν κατ' εἰκόνα τινὸς τῶν γεγονότων.

Almost the same words are to be found in *de mundo* 3. And the same general conception is reflected in *de opif. mundi*, 47, 48, 49 and 51; and *leg. alleg.* III, 31.

An examination of the above passages indicates that Philo held at least three clearly distinguishable conceptions concerning the relation of *Gen.* 1:27 and 2:7. (1) The first group of passages contains the conception of which we have already spoken in their connection, and it is only necessary here to recall that *Gen.* 2:7 is interpreted of the progenitor of the human race, and 1:27 of

the archetypal pattern, the prototype according to which the man of Gen. 2:7 as well as the whole race was formed. (2) According to the conception furnished by the second group of passages which we have adduced, both Gen. 1:27 and 2:7 are interpreted of historical man. By this interpretation the former passage refers to the man of virtue, the latter to the man of passion and baseness. (3) The third conception confines itself to a single individual and distinguishes between different parts of the same person. It is stated by Philo that that part of the soul which is the most important and is called the mind (*νοῦς*) is that part of man which is said to be according to the image and likeness of God. By implication the passage in the second chapter of Gen. (2:7) refers only to the mortal part of the man. It is very doubtful, however, whether Philo would have carried this interpretation far enough explicitly to affirm this implication.

It is evident that the prevailing conception of Philo concerning Gen. 1:27 and 2:7<sup>11</sup> can hardly be said to be that of a "heavenly man" and an "earthly man," the one created in the image of God and the other formed from the dust of the ground. Rather the man who is virtuous and the man who is base, or the two different parts of the one being, viz., soul and body, generally figure in his thought, even, as has already been indicated, to the point of inconsistency and confusion in the same passage. In two passages (*de plantatione*, 5 and *de mundo*, 3. Cf. Wis. 2:23) he declares explicitly that by virtue of the inbreathed "spirit of life" the man was said to be in the image of God. And while in the first group of passages he speaks of the heavenly man as the first (*πρότερον*) he prevalently means by the term "first man" the man of Gen. 2:7 and this always in the connection where the man's soul is regarded as constituting him according to the image of God. So *de opif. mundi*, 47, 48, 49, 51. The view which was first mentioned appears not only without controlling significance for Philo, but it may well be questioned whether it exercised any large influence elsewhere, as it does not appear in any other writing. On the contrary, the facts indicate that the influence of his thought was along the line of the third of the conceptions mentioned. See *Secrets of Enoch*, 30:10; *Wisdom*, 1:4; see also 8:19, 20). It is not impossible, yet not clearly established, that the later Rabbinic notion of the double formation of Adam sustains some relation to it. (Cf. SIEGFRIED,

---

<sup>11</sup>I am largely indebted for the above references to RYLE, *Philo and Holy Scripture*, pp. 3-5, 8, 9. He purports to give all the passages of Philo in which Gen. 1:26, 27, and 2:7 are used. To these I have added some references of my own, and I judge that the passages adduced represent the various phases of Philo's thought adequately if not completely.

*Philo. etc.*, pp. 289-302; SCHIELE, *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1899, pp. 26-31; TAYLOR, *Sayings of Jewish Fathers*, pp. 156-58).

It would be superfluous to argue against the influence of either the second or the third of the conceptions of Philo above referred to on the thought of Paul in I Cor. 15:45-49. Philo's second conception is purely ethical and the third is a combination of ethical and psychological. That the fundamental thought of Paul is neither of these is perfectly evident.

That Paul is not dependent upon the first conception of Philo seems clear from the fact that they differ in the following essential features. (1) To Philo the heavenly man is first, but for Paul he is last. (2) Philo regards the heavenly man as the type of the earthly man; Paul reverses this making the earthly man the type of the heavenly man (Rom. 5:14). (3) Philo combines Gen. 1:27 with 2:7 as a basis for his conception; Paul makes no use of Gen. 1:27 for the conception of the heavenly man and the fact that he uses in the context another verse from Genesis indicates that he did not have in mind the passage 1:27 as a basis for the conception of the "second Adam". (4) Although Philo regards man as bearing the image of the λόγος or the archetypal man (*Confusion de ling.* 28; *leg. alleg.* III. 31) it in no wise corresponds to Paul's conception. Philo has reference to the "reasoning in us as a copy of the divine reasoning, the word above us" (*quis rer. div. haer.* 48. Cf. *confusion de ling.* 28). Whatever Paul may say elsewhere about conforming to the image of Christ, he here has in mind the fact that we shall in the future life have a body like the body of the present exalted Christ (I Cor. 15:49; Phil. 3:21). (5) Paul repudiates with unequivocal clearness the general conception upon which the Philonic doctrine rests and effectually declares thereby his independence of the doctrine itself. (cf. above p. 18f.)

There is another fact to be mentioned which points strongly in the direction of those already mentioned. It was suggested above that the passages from which the first conception was drawn were in reality not clear or free from ambiguity. If one read beyond the immediate context in the second it becomes apparent that Philo gradually leaves this conception and passes into the second named above, and in section 48 he expressly says that "this man, Moses affirms, was an image and imitation of God, being breathed into in his face in which is the place of the sensations, by which the creator endowed the body with a soul." Now in these words he is wavering between the second general conception mentioned and the thought reflected in the first passage quoted from him. In the third passage he is ambiguous if not inconsistent, and in the first passage, in which there is the least confusion of thought and expres-

sion, the antithesis between the heavenly and the earthly man is neither defined with clearness nor quite consistently maintained. It seems then only fair to say that this pre-existent heavenly man was for Philo largely a formal term. When he begins to interpret it he passes (except in one case) directly to another conception quite unlike it. If Paul was influenced by Philo it could only have been in a merely formal manner. He must have chosen to accept a purely rhetorical formula rather than a fundamental idea. In that case it would seem to admit of little question that he must have held the essential features of his doctrine antecedently to his knowledge of Philo and merely adopted from Philo the terms in which to express it.

But the evidence will scarcely allow us to suppose that even the terms of his thought were derived from Philo. In the first place it is not at all clear that Paul knew of this conception of Philo, for as shown above his apparent controversial reference in verse 46 may well be directed elsewhere. In the second place the term itself is not found in Philo. Philo speaks only of the earthly and heavenly man, but the fundamental element of Paul's conception is exhibited in the term "second Adam". His term "heavenly man" refers to the risen and not to the pre-existent Christ. In the third place, it will shortly appear that the elements of this conception were derived from a source which is also ample to explain the origin of the term. It is consequently gratuitous to seek even so much as that in Philo.

English commentators generally (and a few German) have assumed that this term the "second Adam" was a common Jewish designation of the Messiah and that we have here simply an exhibition of Paul's Jewish learning. (See e. g. STANLEY, *Corinthians*; FINDLAY, *Exp. Greek Testament, in loco*; even SANDAY-HEADLAM, *Romans*, p. 136, and WEISS (apparently) on *Romans* 5:14. More cautiously HEINRICI and SCHMIEDEL *in loco*). Recent investigation however has shown this opinion to be quite without foundation (see Moore *J. B. L.* 1897, pp. 158-161; and SCHIELE, *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1899, pp. 20-31). The passages which were relied upon to support the view were all derived from Neve Shalom, book IX (cf. WEISS, *Romans* 5:14) a work by a Spanish Jew in the fifteenth century<sup>12</sup>. This work is confessedly a conglomerate dealing with a wide range of questions of every kind, and is the merest hodge-podge of philosophy, exegesis and theology. "Aristotle and Cabala and Christian controversy jostle one another

<sup>12</sup>The most striking similarity to the thought of Paul is to be found in IX. 5, fol. 150, b.: "The heifer which the Messiah will offer will be an atonement for sin universally, to do away transgression, and to put an end to the sin of the human race. As the first Adam was the first in sin so the Messiah

in it," and it is not improbable that Christian influence explains the existence of the phrase here. It was not first quoted for the purpose to which it is now put, but rather the opposite. The present use of the material is the result of misunderstanding on the part of later scholars, and the persistence of uncritical tradition. (Cf. MOORE, *op. cit.*, p. 160-61; SCHIELE, *op. cit.*, p. 23). Besides this work, reference is sometimes made to another Cabalistic commentary on the Pentateuch from about 1500 A. D., but the speculations which it contains concerning the "upper" and the "lower Adam" have apparently no relevance to the matter here in question. Thus the material which is generally used to establish the Rabbinic doctrine of a "second Adam" is quite inadequate. It not only dates from the fifteenth century of our era, but cannot in any true sense be considered representative of Jewish tradition.

The attempt to find the doctrine in other Jewish sources seems equally fruitless. Taylor (*Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*, pp. 56-58) says that the conception of the two Adams permeates the entire Midrash. The manner in which he speaks, however, is so vague as to render it very questionable whether the conception he has in mind is the one at present under investigation. The quotations by which he illustrates his discussion clearly refer to another matter. But Ginsberg (Article, Adam Kadmon, *Jewish Encyclopedia I*) ventured the explicit opinion that the Philonic and Pauline conceptions are both to be explained as dependent directly upon the Midrash<sup>18</sup>. But here again the logic seems at fault. The passages cited by him fail to show that the conception of the Midrash is a possible source for either, even if it be supposed to be of sufficient antiquity to create no chronological difficulty. But even this much is a matter of serious question. Ginsberg himself states that the oldest Rabbinic source for the term Adam Kadmon (first or original man) is *Num. R. X*. To argue from this the currency of our conception in the time of Paul is certainly hazardous. It involves not only an inference which must span centuries, but what is more violent infers one term (last Adam) from the existence of another (first Adam).

The conception which appears in the Targumic literature is also of quite another character. The Targum of Palestine has nothing to say of the creation of a "first" and a "second" man but contains the

---

shall be the last (Adam?) to remove sin utterly." In IX. 8 it reads: "The last Adam is the Messiah, as it is said he shall be higher than Moses." Moore thinks that the reference in IX. 9 is not to the Messiah as the second Adam but to the perfect man of the messianic age. "As we might say 'the coming man.'"

<sup>18</sup>CLEMEN, *Chronologie der Paulinischen Briefe*, p. 273, has also suggested that we have here a simple quotation from a Midrash.

tradition of the double formation of the one man as follows: (Gen. 2:7). "And the Lord God created man in two formations and took from the place of the house of the sanctuary and from the four winds of the world and mixed all the waters of the world and created him red, black and white; and breathed into his nostrils the inspiration (nishmetha) of life and there was in the body of Adam the inspiration of a speaking spirit (leruach mallela) unto the illumination of the eyes and the hearing of the ears". (Ethridge's Translation). There is nothing to even hint at the other conception. If we compare this with the earlier Targums (*Onkelos* and *Jerusalem*)<sup>14</sup> it appears that even this doctrine was not an early one since it appears in neither of them. The latter may show it in its incipency, but without the later and fully developed conception its presence here would not be suspected. The beginning of such a conception is at least possible in IV *Ezra* 3:5, "et imperasti pulveri: et dedit tibi Adam corpus mortuum sed et ipsum figmentum manuum tuarum erat, et insufflasti in eum spiritum vitae et factus est vivens coram te," And *Apoc. Baruch* 48:46. "For thou didst of old command the dust to produce Adam." (Cf. I Tim. 2:13 and IV *Ezra* 7:116 (46). But upon this no emphasis should be placed.

There is a passage in Sirach (24:28) that has hitherto been overlooked in which the term "last" (man) appears. But it is evident at a glance that this has no reference to the Messiah. It and its parallel term the "first" (man) are intended as an all inclusive expression for mankind which the writer thus indicts for its ignorance of Wisdom. There is no direct evidence that even in this sense the term was a common one. Positive evidence that Sirach had no thought of a "first" and a "second" or last man as two distinct creations is to be found in 17:1-3 where he combines Gen. 1:17 and 2:7 to express a single idea.

This without question is the ordinary view of his age. He is the mouthpiece for his time rather than an independent progressive thinker (see especially 3:21-24).

The term "first" man or Adam is, however, a rather common one in Jewish literature. Its first occurrence is probably in Job 15:7, "Art thou the first man that was born?" According to some authorities (BUDDE, *Hand-Kommentar zum A. T., Hiob*, pp. 77, 78) there is here only a reference to Wisdom and none to a "first man." Others (e. g. DAVIDSON, *Cambridge Bible, ad loc*) regard it as an allusion to a legendary being who antedated the creation of the world and had access to the mysteries of God. In this case it would

<sup>14</sup>Jer. Targ. "And Adam became a soul of life." Targ. Onk. "And the Lord God created Adam from the dust of the ground and breathed upon his face the breath of life (lives) and it became in Adam a discoursing spirit."



ally itself with the conception which lies, according to the most probable interpretation, back of Ezek. 28:11ff. If the second part of the parallelism be taken as determinative on this point, this interpretation seems at least probable. But certainly the most natural interpretation is to refer the words to Adam, the first individual of the race. This seems distinctly probable also in the light of the legendary character which Adam assumes in Jewish theology. Even as early as *Sirach* (49:16) he was said to have been above every created thing, and the writer of the *Apocalypse of Baruch* says (4:3) that Adam knew the secrets of God and that before his expulsion from Paradise he was shown the heavenly temple. (Cf. IV *Ezra* 3:6, also *Secrets of Enoch*, 30:8ff; PHILO, *de opif. mundi*, 47ff. See also TENNANT, *The Fall and Original Sin*, pp. 149ff, 242ff. For later Jewish thought see GINSBERG, Article, *Adam*, *Jewish Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, and KOHUT, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, III, pp. 231-252).

After Job the term occurs next in *Sirach* in the passage quoted above, and in Palestinian literature perhaps next in *Enoch* 60:8 where Adam is referred to as "the first man whom the Lord of spirits created" (Charles' translation). Its occurrence in the *Sibylline Oracles* (Book III, 25, Geffcken), the relevant portions of which are earlier than the passage in *Enoch*, as well as in the later Alexandrian writings, *Wisdom* (7:1, 10-1) and Philo<sup>18</sup>, strongly suggests that its currency was wider during this period than its rather infrequent occurrence in extant Palestinian literature would indicate.

In the literature approximately contemporary with Paul it occurs with greater frequency and its usage is well established. In the *Apocalypse of Baruch* 56:5 occurs the following. "The transgression wherewith Adam the first man transgressed," and in IV *Ezra* 3:21 (cf. 6:54) we read "cor enim malignum baiolans primus Adam transgressus et victus est, sed et omnes qui eo nati sunt." (Gunkel's remark concerning the "Urmensch" in Kautzsch's *Pseudepigraphen*, *ad loc.* is absolutely without foundation). The same expression occurs also in Josephus, *Antiq.* I, 2, 3 (Niese I, 67); *Antiq.* I. 3, 3 (Niese I. 82); *Antiq.* VIII, 3, 1 (Niese VIII, 62)<sup>19</sup>. *Sanhedrin* IV, 5 (BARCLAY, *Talmud*, p. 185) is another witness for the expression in the following words: "The Holy One, blessed be He! stamped every man with the stamp of the first Adam" (Schwab omits "first" in his translation). This instance is all the more interesting as reflecting the usage in a circle other than that of the

<sup>18</sup>*de opif. mundi*, 47-51, *passim*.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. 1 Tim. 3:15, and the Greek *Apocalypse of Baruch* 9 (cf. 180a), a Christian work of the second century, but undoubtedly using Jewish materials (see JAMES, *Texts and Studies*, Vol. V., No. 1).

Apocalyptic writers (and Josephus) and probably represents an early usage in the Rabbinic school.

It is quite clear, however, that in all these passages there is no implied antithesis of the "first" and a "second Adam," but that Adam was contrasted in thought with all later humanity. This is essentially the antithesis even in *Sirach*. As Schiele well says "If the term 'first Adam' was frequently used and the term 'last Adam' never occurs in connection with it, the evidence is all but conclusive that such an antithesis was never conceived."

Paul's doctrine of the second Adam is not then to be traced to Philo, nor is it simply carried over from contemporary Jewish thought. It is to the latter that we must look, however, for certain elements which enter into the conception.

As indicated above it is only in contrast with the historical Adam that Christ receives this designation. It is a term of function and not of nature. It represents an attempt to set forth clearly from one angle of vision the significance of Christ for those who have committed themselves to Him. Adam as head of humanity has by his conduct fastened upon it the experience of death. The risen Christ has by His resurrection conquered death and thus guaranteed a similar experience to so much of present mortal humanity as identifies itself with Him. The earnest of this they already have in the spirit. He thereby becomes the second beginner of the race, the head of a risen humanity, the second Adam.

Now it is beyond question that so far as Paul speaks of Adam and his significance for the race, he derives his thought from current Jewish theology in which he had been trained. According to an earlier and somewhat prevalent view, it is true, the origin of sin and death in the world was due to the conduct of the angels who defiled themselves with women according to the story of Gen. 6:1-4<sup>17</sup>. But by the time of Paul this view had been largely displaced by one which found the explanation of the introduction of sin and death into the world, in the story of Adam's transgression as recorded in the third chapter of Genesis. This view is the prevalent one in later Rabbinic thought (cf. TENNANT, *The Fall and*

<sup>17</sup>This position is concisely put in the language of *Enoch* 10:8: "The whole earth has been defiled through the teaching of the works of Azazel (the leader of the angels) to him ascribe all the sin." It is fully set forth in *Enoch*, chaps. 6-8, 81 30, and is found also in 54:6, 64:2, and 69:6, 11. It is referred to also with varying points of view in *Jubilees* 4:22; 5:1ff; *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, *Reuben* 5; *Daniel* 5; *Naphtali* 3; and *Levi* 3. Sporadic references to the same conception appear also in some of the later writings. It receives recognition in one of the visions in the Apocalypse of Baruch (56:10-15) and is probably the background of Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 11:10 concerning the necessity for the veiling of the head of woman in public. In *Enoch* 32:6 it seems to be said that Adam and Eve were responsible for nothing except their own sin.

*Original Sin*, pp. 145-176), and begins to appear (leaving aside the account in Genesis) as early as the second century B. C. To give here all the various phases of the general view which are reflected in the Jewish literature contemporary, or nearly so, with Paul, would not contribute to the purpose of this essay<sup>18</sup>. Neither would it be possible within the limits which we must impose upon ourselves. We need only notice two phases of the general conception, both of which are closely related to the thought of Paul.

The first phase receives succinct expression in the words of *Sirach* 25:24. We are not here concerned with the thought which the writer makes prominent respecting the responsibility of the woman in the Fall<sup>19</sup>. Our chief concern is with the two following points: (1) that the transgression of the first parents is not related causally to the sinfulness of humanity, but is only spoken of as the first occurrence of sin among men. (2) The whole race, however, is involved in the consequences of their transgression, it being set forth as the cause of physical death which is the universal experience of man.

This same thought is found also in the *Apocalypse of Baruch*. This writing has been pronounced the best witness to the Rabbinic theology of the first century of the Christian era, now known to us. (Cf. TENNANT, *op. cit.*, p. 212). The view of this writer is well represented in the words (23:4) "Because when Adam sinned and death was decreed against those who should be born," etc. Again in 54:15 we read, "For though Adam sinned and brought untimely<sup>20</sup> death on all." And in 56:6, "For owing to his (Adam's) transgression untimely death came into being." (See also 17:3; 19:8; cf. 4:3). This view which makes Adam the cause of physical death and woes is reflected also in IV Ezra 3:7: *et huic mandasti diligentiam unam tuam; et praeterivit eam, et statim instituisti in eum mortem et in nationibus eius*. The same conception is found in the Alexandrian

<sup>18</sup>This has been done with great ability and learning by Tennant, *The Fall and Original Sin*, Cambridge University Press, 1903. The fullness of discussion and soberness of judgment which the book exhibits place it easily in the front rank of all others which discuss this subject. This part of the present paper was written before I had seen his book and I am gratified to find it supported by his work.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. 1 Cor. 11:2-3; 1 Tim. 2:13-15; 4 Macc. 18:10; *Apocalypse of Baruch* 48:42; *Gospel of James* 13. For a discussion of the meaning of the temptation for Eve and her prominence in the transaction as this was conceived by some Jewish writers, see TENNANT, *op. cit.* pp. 208ff; THACKERAY, *The Relation of St. Paul to Contemporary Jewish Thought*, pp. 50-57. Cf. JOSEPHUS *Antiq.* I. 1:4 (Niese I. 49).

<sup>20</sup>CHARLES, *ad loc.* thinks that the use of the word "untimely" indicates that the writer of this passage thought only that Adam's sin brought premature death, but this is probably to be regarded as a mere standing epithet of death. See especially the next passage, "came into being."

literature as e. g. the *Secrets of Enoch* 30:16; *Wisdom* 2:24, both of which are at this point probably a reflection of Palestinian thought. In view of these and other passages yet to be noticed Tennant seems amply justified when he remarks that "in all schools of Jewish thought the first parents of the race came to be regarded (soon after *Sirach*) as the cause to their descendants of physical woes and death."

But in the *Apocalypse of Baruch* we are introduced to a conception which goes beyond this. Thus in 48:42, 43, we read "O Adam, what hast thou done to all those who are born from thee? and what will be said to the first Eve who hearkened to the serpent? For all this multitude are going to corruption, nor is there any numbering of those whom the fire devours." This it should be noticed does not necessarily advance beyond the passage quoted above from *Sirach*, as respects the question of the relation of Adam's sin to that of his descendants. On that matter it is silent. But it develops the second conception reflected in that passage. Instead now of confining the results of Adam's sin to the prevalence of physical death, Adam is regarded as responsible also for the future punishment and woes of humanity, the great majority of which meets such a fate. This thought seems to involve some theory of the solidarity of the race and the transgression of its head. That the writer does not have in mind any theory respecting the inheritance of an evil or fallen nature from Adam which left posterity helpless appears from the context. For in vss. 46 and 47. (cf. 40) he clearly makes the punishment which he has just referred to dependent upon the voluntary transgression of each individual. He seems to regard man as conditionally liable to future punishment because of the transgression of the first parents in Paradise, the state of each individual being actually determined by his voluntary sin and sinfulness. In 56:1 the writer seems to regard human nature as having been at least partially deranged by the fall, and the condition of men after death as somewhat affected. It is not explicitly stated that this derangement affected the entire nature, and probably was not so conceived. At the same time it shows that Paul's advance at this point is not unnatural.

This advance is even more emphatic in IV *Ezra* than in *Baruch*. Indeed we have in this writing "the most serious and impassioned struggle with the problem of sin and evil from a Jew of this period" (PORTER, *Yale Studies*, p. 146). It is sufficient for our purpose to quote only one passage. Thus 7:116-20 reads, Et respondi et dixi: hic sermo meus primus et novissimus, quoniam melius erat non dare terram Adam, vel cum jam dedisset coercere eum ut non peccaret. Quid enim prodest omnibus in praesenti vivere in tristitia et mortuos sperare punitionem? O tu quid fecisti

Adam? si enim tu peccasti, non est factum solius tuus casus sed et nostrum qui ex te advenimus. Quid enim nobis prodest si promissum est nobis immortale tempus, nos vero mortalia opera egimus? Et quoniam praedicta est nobis perennis spes, nos vero pessime vani facti sumus? (See the continuation of the passage and also especially 3:21-26; 7:11ff). If we compare the passages quoted with those already referred to and others (e. g. 3:8, 12, 13, 20ff, 35, 36; 4:30, 39; 7:68; 8:35) it becomes apparent immediately that in the main we have the usual Jewish view of the beginning of death and sin, and that it differs principally in being a further development along the lines already indicated<sup>21</sup>. As in the single passage from the Apocalypse of Baruch, we have here the future punishment of sinners connected with the transgression of Adam. In just what way this is conceived is again left unexplained. But there is hardly reflected the conception of the inherited evil nature from Adam in consequence of the Fall<sup>22</sup>.

Into further discussion of the doctrine of sin as reflected in IV Ezra we need not enter<sup>23</sup>. It is clear that for its beginning it is traced to the transgression of Adam and Eve. Its continuance in posterity is due to the fact that from the beginning an evil seed was in humanity, which voluntarily chose to act in a sinful manner.

When now we look for the fundamental conception of which all these various views are but phases, we find it to be that Adam is the head of the race and that as such his transgression involves serious consequences affecting all his posterity. It is uniformly regarded as the cause of physical death, and in the time of Paul was perhaps generally conceived as affecting the condition of humanity after death. That it involved also the transmission of a deranged nature was at least beginning to be a matter of speculation. It is true that this is not a uniform conception; for even those writings which reflect it affirm also individual responsibility<sup>24</sup>. But it is no

<sup>21</sup>See for a different interpretation Charles, *The Apocalypse of Baruch*, pp. 91-94 and p. LXX. His comparison of the views of *Baruch* and *iv Ezra* on this point is unusually one sided and incorrect.

<sup>22</sup>Charles, *Apocalypse of Baruch*, p. 93 and p. LXX., thinks that *iv Ezra* clearly teaches inherited sinfulness. He connects it with the later Rabbinic doctrine of the yecer. He is correct in this, but he misinterprets both.

<sup>23</sup>The doctrine of the evil impulse which is reflected in this work has been carefully discussed by Porter, *op. cit.* pp. 146-52, and Tennant, *op. cit.* pp. 220-232, has discussed the matter fully from a more general point of view.

<sup>24</sup>e. g. *Apocalypse of Baruch* 54:15. "For though Adam sinned and brought untimely death on all, yet those who were born from him each of them has prepared for his own soul torment to come and again each of them has chosen for himself glories to come." 54:19. "Adam is therefore not the cause save of his own soul, and each one of us has been the Adam of his own soul." Cf. *iv Ezra* 4:36ff; 7:48; 8:59ff; 9:10ff; *Psalms of Solomon* 9:7-9 (cf. RYLE AND JAMES *Introduction*, p. 1); *Sirach* 15:14ff; *Jubilees* 5:12-16;

less true that the double conception is to be found in Paul. (See Rom. 1:18ff; 7:7-25; 3:6, 19; I Cor. 4:13; 6:2; 11:32)<sup>25</sup>. There is no reasonable ground for denying that Paul derived his general conception from Judaism.

Nor is the contrast between Adam and the Messiah unknown to Jewish theology. In later Jewish thought we have expressions in which it is clearly set forth. Thus in *Bereschith Rabba*, Chaps. 12, 14 "As soon as the first man sinned everything became perverted and will no more return to order until the Messiah comes." Or again in *Midrash R.*, Psalm 17:15 "Only when he shall arise who is formed in thy image, the Messiah, shall Adam behold thy face." (Cf. KOHUT, *op. cit.*, p. 248; EDELSHEIM, *Life and Times*, etc., I. pp. 175ff.)

But fortunately we do not have to depend upon inference from later Rabbinic theology. In the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, *Levi* 18:19-24, especially 22ff, we have a very striking passage.

19. καὶ οὐκ ἔσται διαδοχὴ αὐτοῦ εἰς γενεὰς καὶ γενεὰς ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος  
 20. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱερωσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐκλείψει πᾶσα ἁμαρτία  
 21. καὶ οἱ ἄνομοι καταπαύσουσιν εἰς κακὰ.  
 22. καὶ γε αὐτὸς ἀνοίξει τὰς θύρας τοῦ παραδείσου  
 23. καὶ ἀποστήσει τὴν ἀπειλοῦσαν ρομφαίαν κατὰ τοῦ Ἀδάμ.  
 24. καὶ δώσει τοῖς ἁγίοις φαγεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ξύλου τῆς ζωῆς. 26

The significance of this passage in *Levi* 18 is greatly increased by the fact that it not only is early (Bousset and others regard it as Maccabean, certainly with much ground) but it presents precisely the contrast that is found in Paul. A comparison of *Enoch* 85:3 with 90:37 discovers in those chapters essentially the same conception. Both Adam and the Messiah are symbolized by the same animal, the white bull, and the conditions which first existed with Adam are conceived as being restored by the Messiah. Although no other passage so explicit can, perhaps, be cited in contemporary Jewish literature, it is scarcely necessary to suppose that the conception was confined to these two writers. We have already

*Assumption of Moses* 12:4ff. See also *Enoch* 32:6; 98:4ff; *Baruch* 21:11; 2 *Macc.* 7:32-34.

<sup>25</sup>Just how Paul harmonized the two conceptions we need not here inquire. Pfeiderer considers that Paul did not attempt a harmonization but held the two points of view even though they are contradictory. The method by which they were harmonized in Judaism may be seen in *iv Ezra* 3:22; *Apocalypse of Baruch* 18:1; 48:42-48; 54:15. Cf. *Jubilees* 5:12-16; JOSEPHUS *Ant.* 18:1, 3, and *Pirke Aboth* 3:15. "Everything is foreseen by God, though freedom of choice is given to man."

<sup>26</sup>Quoted by Bousset in the *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1900, pp. 159-173. Cf. also p. 216ff. The Greek of the *Testaments* is inaccessible to me.

shown that by the beginning of the Christian era the present undesirable condition and destiny of humanity was held to be due to the transgression of Adam. It is unnecessary to cite particular passages (see a classic one, *Psalms of Solomon* 17) to show that all these conditions, it was held, would be reversed for the righteous when the Messiah and his kingdom should appear. The contrast is then a constant, even if latent, element of Jewish thought and its expression is natural to a writer to whose purpose it contributed.

In so far then as the elements of Paul's conception of the second Adam are to be sought in outside sources, they are derived directly from contemporary Judaism. This gave to him (1) Adam the "first man" (Adam), the progenitor of the race. (2) Adam the head of the race and responsible for the introduction of death as an experience of the race. (3) The contrast between the consequences of Adam's sin and the results of the activity of the Messiah. At the most these, however, are only contributing elements to a doctrine quite otherwise founded and independently held. They suggest a terminology and the form of expression for his fundamental conception. They do not furnish the essential content.

His own experience is the decisive factor in the development of the conception. It was his experience on the way to Damascus that convinced him that Jesus was risen from the dead (I Cor. 15:8; 9:1; Gal. 1:1; 1:16; II Cor. 4:4-6), a conviction which was corroborated and strengthened by the testimony of the other disciples (I Cor. 15:3-7). It was also his unwavering conviction of this fact that gave him hope for resurrection unto life for others (I Cor. 15:12-19; 6:14; II Cor. 4:14; I Thess. 4:14; Phil. 3:10, 11, 20, 21; see also Rom. 4:24, 25; 5:10, 21; 6:4, 7-10, 22, 23 et al.). He believed that God would raise up those who had faith in Christ because He had raised Christ, and in I Cor. 15:12-19 he declares explicitly "If Christ hath not been raised our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain, and they which are fallen asleep in Christ have perished." But Christ was to him not only the promise of a resurrection for others, he was also the "beginning", "the first-born among many brethren," "the very first" sample of the others. (I Cor. 15:20-23; Rom. 8:29; Col. 1:18). It was by virtue of the fact that Christ was this "beginning", this "first born among many brethren," this originator and guarantee of a risen humanity that he was for Paul the "second (representative) man," the "last (perfect) Adam." His doctrine was based on a fact given in his own experience. The doctrine itself was a product of his own reflective thought; the formal mould in which it was expressed was suggested by contemporary Jewish theology. Both terms, the "last Adam" and the "second man" are Paul's own contribution to the terminology necessary to set forth his conception.

## II. PRE-EXISTENCE.

The preceding discussion has shown that Paul's doctrine of Christ as the "second Adam" was in no way connected with or influenced by the idea of the pre-existence of Christ. The exclusion of the latter idea from that doctrine is not to be understood, however, as a denial to him of such a conception. That he believed in the pre-existence of Christ there can be no doubt<sup>27</sup>. Nor does it seem necessary to argue now that that pre-existence was conceived by him as actual rather than ideal. This is granted by interpreters of all schools and may be considered as established beyond question<sup>28</sup>. So much cannot be said, however, as respects the conditions of Christ's pre-existent state and the form under which it was conceived. An investigation of that phase of the apostle's thought is the next step in our discussion.

The passages in which the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ is either explicitly taught or implied, are: Gal. 4:4; 1 Cor. 8:6; 10:4; 2 Cor. 8:9; Rom. 8:3; and especially Phil. 2:5-8<sup>29</sup>. It is demanded also for the explanation of the Christological sections of Colossians and Ephesians.

When these passages are scrutinized it quickly becomes clear that they fall into groups. 1 Cor. 8:6, 10:4, and the material in Colossians and Ephesians deal with the function of Christ rather than the conditions and form of his pre-existent state. Their contribution to the topic at present under discussion is not large and they will be discussed later in the proper place. When these are

---

<sup>27</sup>Cf. especially BRYCHLAG, *op. cit.* II, p. 78; HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.*, p. 82, and note 3.

<sup>28</sup>Gilbert, in his latest book, *The First Interpreters of Jesus*, pp. 31-40, still holds that Paul nowhere teaches more than an ideal pre-existence of Christ.

<sup>29</sup>Emphasis is also sometimes laid on other passages in the epistles as e. g. 1 Cor. 11:3 (see PFLEIDERER, *Urchristenthum*, 2d Ed. I. pp. 227ff), but without sufficient warrant. This passage does not contain even a suggestion of the idea of pre-existence, but refers to the risen Christ. Vincent lays stress on 1 Cor. 1:24; 10:9; Rom. 10:6. They may be disregarded. 1 Tim. 1:15 may most naturally be interpreted as reflecting the idea of pre-existence, but the authenticity of the pastorals is so doubtful that I prefer to exclude them from discussion altogether. This may be done all the more easily since their contribution to New Testament thought is not in the line of Christology.



excluded from consideration there remain to us four others. Careful attention discovers that these also naturally fall into two pairs, the first pair consisting of Gal. 4:4 and Rom. 8:3, and the second of 2 Cor. 8:9, and Phil. 2:5-8, the basis of division being the clearness with which they reflect the idea of pre-existence, and the definiteness of their indication of its conditions.

The first pair both agree in the characterization of Jesus the Christ as the son of God. This term does not in itself of necessity connote pre-existence. Paul uses the term about 17 times and for him it appears to express three ideas. It designates Christ as (1), the object of God's love, (Rom. 5:10; 8:32, cf. Rom. 9:26), (2), as morally like God (Rom. 8:3; 8:29; Gal. 4:4, 6). (3), as God's representative (Rom. 1:2, 4, 9; 1 Cor. 1:9; 1 Thess. 1:10). Other passages seem to reflect in part all three ideas.

The term is, then, a religious one. It is used to describe Christ's peculiar relation to God. Its content seems to be wholly within the moral realm. If we attempt to distinguish between the content of sonship and the basis of sonship at this point, Paul will be found to give no hint of the ultimate basis of that sonship in any context where the term itself is used. In Christian thought previous to Paul it occurs overwhelmingly in a moral sense<sup>80</sup>.

The few passages in Luke (see in the last note) in which it bears another meaning have no relation to Paul's thought. The term itself does not, then, carry the idea of pre-existence.

Nor does the verb in either passage even when the subject is God, of necessity imply the pre-existence of the person who is the object of the action. This seems clear from the fact that both words are used in speaking of those who have come forward as messengers of God. Thus *πέμνω* is used of John the Baptist (John 1:33) and of Jesus (John 4:34; 5:23, 24, 30, 37; 7:16; cf. Luke 16:24, 27; 20:11, 12, 13. See also Thayer). In both cases the emphasis is upon the representative character of the one mentioned. His mission and not his origin fills the circle of mental vision. It is true that this cannot so certainly be said of such pas-

---

<sup>80</sup>It is used in the New Testament outside of Paul in four different senses. (1). In the creative sense, distinguishing the person as one who owes his existence to the creative power of God (Luke 1:35; 3:38). (2). In an affectional or elective sense, marking the person as the object of divine love and approval, or as sustaining intimate communion with God (Matt. 11:27; 17:5; 27:40; John 3:16, 17; 3:35; 5:19; 11:4). (3). As connoting likeness to God, as a son is like a father, a) moral likeness (Matt. 5:9, 45; Luke 6:36; John 1:12; 14:7, 9); b) likeness, not identity, in mode of existence (Luke 20:36. Cf. John 1:14, 18). (4). In the official or theocratic sense, denoting one as exercising authority for God. The term is hardly equivalent to Messiah, but describes rather the basis of messiahship (Mark 3:11; 5:7; 14:61; Matt. 8:29; 16:16; 26:23; Luke 8:28; John 5:22-27).

sages as Wisdom 9:10; 17; 12:25; 16:20, but it should also be noted that the thought is rendered definite in these passages (except 12:25) by a genitive phrase and not by the verb itself.

ἐξαποστέλλω, etymologically meaning to send away from oneself, might seem to present a stronger claim for such a usage but as a matter of fact it does not. It is used frequently in the Septuagint in speaking of prophets or others as messengers of Jehovah to the people (1 Kings 10:22; Jer. 7:25; Zech. 4:9; 7:12; 8:10; 2 Chr. 36:15; Ps. 104:26; 151:4; Mal. 3:1) in which any thought other than that of ambassadorship seems all but excluded. The same usage is found in the New Testament. (See John 1:6; Acts 22:21; 1 Cor. 1:17<sup>81</sup>). These facts warrant us in saying that the idea of pre-existence must be sought elsewhere than simply in the verb which is used.

Nor are we left long in doubt as to how it is to be obtained. An examination of each passage clearly shows that in both the apostle thinks of some change having occurred in the "son" when he was sent into the world on his mission to men.

In Romans (8:3) he is said to have been sent in the likeness of sinful flesh and it does not admit of question that the assumption of this flesh of sin was conceived as coincident with his sending. It is true that the words are capable of another interpretation. If it were clearly established on independent grounds that the apostle did not believe in the pre-existence of Christ, and regarded his sonship as based on his ethical character and likeness to God, as a historical person and wholly unconnected with metaphysical considerations, this passage could easily be adjusted to such a thought. The use of the term son would involve, then, a mental prolepsis and the thought would really be a form of adoptionism. But this is quite contrary to the apostle's general thought, and has no support in any passage in the epistles. If this passage were unique in Paul it could not be regarded as conclusive for the doctrine of pre-existence but as he held that doctrine there is no reason for excluding it here. He can have reference here to but one thing and that is the appearance of the son who already existed in the likeness of human flesh.

---

<sup>81</sup>Of course the abstract possibility that these passages are in a measure a reflection of a general doctrine of pre-existence is worthy of some consideration. This seems all the more plausible since the New Testament passages may in some measure be said to reflect some acquaintance with Alexandrianism, in which such a doctrine in some form certainly existed. But the Septuagint shows a well established usage, as above indicated, from which the notion is unquestionably absent, and it seems unnecessary to seek further for an explanation of the New Testament passages which readily yield themselves to this one.

Now it were difficult to find a reason for mentioning the fact that the son was sent in the likeness of the flesh of sin if he did not think of it as involving a change from some other mode of existence. Thus there is involved not only the thought of a pre-existent state, but that state is at least suggested to have been different from the historical one. The choice of ἀμαρτίας as characteristic of the flesh, and the implication that his flesh only resembled flesh of sin and was not actually sinful (cf. 8:3b) seems clearly to reflect the conception that the assumption of such a mode of existence involved humiliation. We are thus led to the view that even in this passage the prehistorical state of Christ was conceived as distinctly above the human. Beyond this either in definiteness or clearness we may not go<sup>22</sup>.

In Gal. (4:4) much the same conception is reflected. As indicated above, the verb cannot be used to prove the idea of pre-existence<sup>23</sup>. But as in the Romans passage it is rather the whole context together which contains the thought. The statement that he "became from woman" seems pointless unless it is regarded as in this case something unexpected and peculiar. To make such a statement concerning a merely human personality would be exceedingly trite. Even if all human souls were regarded by the apostle as pre-existent (and this cannot be shown) the case would be the same. The coming of the son into the human race by the ordinary method of birth as well as the fact that he became a member of the Jewish nation (cf. Rom. 1:4, and SANDAY-HEADLAM, *ad loc.*) seem to the apostle worthy of comment. This could hardly be true unless he thought of it as involving not only the previous existence of the son, but also a change in the condition and mode of his existence. It is quite evident also that he regards this historical existence as a humiliation. We are thus led, as in the previous passage, to find the apostle implying that in his prehistorical state Christ was distinctly above the human. But, as in the previous passage, the words afford no warrant for any statement beyond this.

When we turn to the second pair of passages we find ourselves on somewhat more definite ground. The fact of the pre-existence of Christ is altogether assumed as familiar even to the apostle's

<sup>22</sup>We perhaps ought to include Rom. 10:6 at this point. It reflects the peculiar Rabbinic methods of interpretation and the thought is obscure. In any case it tells us nothing in addition to that already suggested. Christ is conceived as having been on high and as having come down; that is, as having pre-existed in a higher state before his historical life. Cf. SANDAY-HEADLAM, *ad loc.*

<sup>23</sup>Most writers seem to use it so. See e. g. LIPSIUS *ad loc.* HOLTZMANN *op. cit.* II, p. 82, STEVENS, *New Testament Theology*, p. 392, note 2.

readers and from the spirit manifested by Christ in changing from that pre-existent state to the historical one, the apostle draws what is to him evidently a very obvious practical lesson.

According to 2 Cor. 8:9, it was a distinct act of grace on the part of the Lord Jesus, due to his love for men, that he came to live among them. Though this life was fraught with rich spiritual consequences for others it was for him, in comparison with his previous estate, one of distinct poverty<sup>84</sup>. Before coming to the earth he had enjoyed such privileges and such a life as constituted real riches. Just what this or these were is not indicated, but of whatever character, the apostle assumes them to be as well known to his readers as to himself.

The thought reflected in 2 Cor. is expressed in Phil. 2:5-8 much more fully and definitely. He clearly sets forth the contrast between the estate of the pre-existent and the historical Christ, and represents the latter as a distinct humiliation<sup>85</sup>. The assumption of the form of a servant and likeness of man (cf. Rom. 8:3) and the attendant experiences is for the apostle the supreme example of humility, for it meant the exchange of the highest conceivable state for the lowest. What that pre-existent state was, he distinctly indicates in the phrase ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ. This, however, itself demands careful definition.

Much has been written on the lexical significance of the word μορφῇ, and its relation to σχῆμα with which it is here associated. The excursus of Lightfoot in his Commentary on Philippians (New edition, pp. 127-133) seems to be taken as the basis of most of the work published since, and is either accepted in toto (HAUPT-MEYER, GIFFORD, *The Incarnation*), or almost exactly reproduced. (TRENCH, *Synonyms of the New Testament*, 11th edition pp. 262-67). Lightfoot's position is summed up by him in the following words: "μορφῇ is contrasted with σχῆμα, (in the Philippians passage) as that which is intrinsic and essential with that which is accidental and outward. And the three clauses imply respectively the true divine nature of our Lord μορφῇ θεοῦ ), the true human nature ( μορφῇ δούλου ), and

<sup>84</sup>Some attempt to explain this passage as wholly concerned with the earthly existence of Jesus, but this is quite arbitrary. See for a good discussion, SCHMIEDEL, *Hand-Kommentar*, II. 220; and especially HEINRICI-MEYER, 8th Ed., *ad loc.*

<sup>85</sup>That Paul means to contrast the pre-existent and historical states of Christ, it is useless now to deny. Cf. VINCENT *Int. Crit. Com.* *ad loc.* and Excursus pp. 78-90, and HOLTZMANN, *op. cit.* p. 82. For an ably supported but one-sided argument that both 2 Cor. 8:9 and Phil. 2:5-11 are concerned wholly with the historic life of Jesus of Nazareth and have nothing to say of pre-existence, see DRUMMOND, *Int. Handbooks to the New Testament*, *ad loc.*

the externals of the human nature (σχήματι ὡς ἀνθρώπου)."

He regards the sense of the term here as "substantially the same which it bears in Greek philosophy", meaning *specific character*, and as such it "must apply to the attributes of the Godhead."

The meaning which Lightfoot here assigns the term he finds to come forward first in the philosophical writings of Plato and Aristotle, and especially of the latter. This he holds to have been transmitted to later Greek writers especially Plutarch and Philo, and to have exercised no little influence upon popular speech. Whether it was from the latter that Paul derived his conception he does not decide, but seems to think it probable. He virtually says that the philosophical meaning was natural to Paul when he transferred the term from the objects of sense to those of the mind. Of this more will be said later.

This work of Lightfoot, though forming the warp and woof of so much that has since been written, is open to very serious criticism.

1. In the first place it is generally held (and even by Lightfoot himself) that μορφή originally meant *form*, and comprised "all those sensible qualities which striking the eye lead to the conviction that we see such and such a thing." But as soon as he gets from Aristotle the philosophical meaning above referred to, he leaves the popular use of the term wholly out of consideration. In this he has fallen into error. He virtually assumes either that in the time of Paul the word had only the philosophical meaning he finds for it in the writings of Aristotle, or that Paul ignored popular usage and returned, consciously or unconsciously, to the philosophers for his thought. But neither of these alternatives can safely be assumed, and as a matter of fact, the first is not supported by the evidence. Not only do Plato and Aristotle use the word in the earlier external sense<sup>86</sup>, but it is to be found so used also in later Greek. The second alternative, the origin of Paul's usage is discussed more fully below and it will be seen to be akin to though not identical with popular thought and usage.

2. In the second place the philosophical meaning which Lightfoot attributes to the term seems in advance of the evidence which is afforded by the passages which he cites. Great scholar that he was, he can hardly escape the charge of the error, so frequent with lesser lights, of allowing his dogmatic conceptions to color his interpretations and cloud his historical insight. He is justified in

---

<sup>86</sup>See especially VINCENT, op. cit. p. 79. Vincent himself seems unconsciously to waver in his conception. On p. 79 he rejects Lightfoot's view, but on p. 57 and elsewhere he has given expression to a view which is essentially that of Lightfoot.

drawing a rather sharp contrast between μορφή and σχῆμα, making the former more fundamental and abiding than the latter, but he overpresses the distinction. In showing as he does that μορφή is used with reference to something more fundamental than the "fleeting transitory appearance which may change every minute", it by no means follows that it must express the fundamental and essential attributes of the thing or individual. In both Plato and Aristotle it is perfectly clear that the μορφή of an individual and the individual itself are not so nearly identical that the two are inseparable. Thus Plato in the *Phaedo* (103,3) says in speaking of the εἶδος "not only is the idea itself to be called always by the same name, but also anything else which, though not itself the idea yet when it exists always has the form (μορφή) of the idea", may be so designated. Here that which is not the idea has the form of the idea whenever it exists. Socrates proceeds to illustrate his meaning by showing that although the number 3 is not oddness yet it is always an odd number and can never be any other. By μορφή here then he means a certain quality of an individual which constitutes it one of a genus. It is true, as Lightfoot argues, that it expresses in this illustration not a material but an abstract quality, but the usage is evidently a figurative and derivative one. It is based on the usage by which the word does represent a material quality and the point might just as easily be illustrated by an example of the latter kind. To infer a general meaning for a word on the basis of a single passage and that one in which the word is manifestly used in a derived and figurative sense has played havoc with lexicography very frequently, as it does here.

Aristotle's general conception of the relation of matter and form is a familiar one. Matter he regarded as the potentiality of becoming, the material substratum of things, and form μορφή, εἶδος as the necessary condition and cause of all existence. Under the term form he includes not only the merely external appearance but also the more permanent organization, or the mode in which a given object or being expresses itself. (Cf. WEBER, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 108ff.). He extends the use of the term to cover immaterial objects, as e. g. when he speaks of the form of courage or justice, but even in this extension it must be evident on reflection that the fundamental conception of μορφή arises from his contemplation of physical nature. This extension is all the easier since, even in the application of the term to physical objects, it expresses a formal and not a material concept.

A passage of which Lightfoot makes much and which he misinterprets is very illuminating as to Aristotle's general conception,

and has a direct bearing on our discussion. In criticising Democritus for the remark that it was clear to anybody what the form (μορφή) of a man was, as it was known by his shape (σχῆματι) and color (χρώματι) he says: (*de Part. An.* I. I. p. 640 B) ὁ τεθνεὺς ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ σχήματος μορφήν ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος a corpse has the same form of appearance but is not a man. On this Lightfoot remarks: (1) "The corpse has the μορφή of the human σχῆμα but it has not the μορφή of a man," and (2) "The form of a man therefore in Aristotle's conception was something more than his sensible appearance." If by this latter remark he meant that μορφή and σχῆμα are not to be identified, he would be quite correct. But he evidently means more, as is suggested by the first statement indicated above. In both statements then he is unquestionably incorrect. Aristotle does not say that the corpse has not the form of a man, nor can the words be interpreted to mean that the corpse has only the form μορφή of the human σχῆμα not the form of man himself. The statement can only mean that the corpse has the same μορφήν σχήματος as a man. The phrase "form of appearance" seems to be equivalent to external or visible form. So far is he then from denying sameness of form (μορφή) to a corpse and a man that, on the contrary, he not only explicitly affirms their form to be the same, but also bases his criticism of Democritus on that precise fact.

But another passage which Lightfoot regards as important in establishing his position, deserves consideration. In his Apology Chapter 9, Justin declares that the Christians do not honor such deities as men form for they see that they are soulless and dead καὶ θεοῦ μορφήν θεοῦ μὴ ἔχοντα (οὐ γὰρ τοιαύτην ἡγούμεθα ἢν φασὶ τινες εἰς τιμὴν μεμιῆσθαι) ἀλλὰ ἐκείνων τῶν φανέντων κακῶν δαιμόνων καὶ δνόματα καὶ σχήματα ἔχειν ..... τὸ σχῆμα μόνον ἀλλάξαντες καὶ μορφωποιήσαντες θεοὺς ἐπονόμασι. It is an insult to God δς ἀδύνητον δόξαν καὶ μορφήν ἔχων etc. On this passage Lightfoot remarks that Justin "appears to contrast the visible σχήματα of demons with the insensible immaterial μορφή of God."

It should be noted that in speaking of the making of these idols he uses the word μορφώσαντες which of course can only have reference to the shaping of the images. Further he does not deny that God has any form but only that these idols have the same form as God, for, as he proceeds to say, God's μορφή as well as his glory is ineffable. To argue from this that the μορφή can

only be the essential attributes of the Godhead is to repeat the error already referred to. The character or nature of that μορφή is not at all described. He is quite correct in supposing that this passage from Justin reflects the same conception as Paul, but that still leaves it an open question what the conception was.

The meaning in classical Greek has already been partially indicated. The fundamental concept expressed in the term is that of form or shape. It is frequently used like the Latin *forma* to mean beautiful shape, and sometimes seems to be almost equivalent to σχῆμα. As already indicated, the philosophical usage neither displaced this more original and more popular one, nor did it travel as far away from it as has apparently been too frequently conceived.

The Septuagint usage appears clearly in the following passages which comprise all the instances of its occurrence. In Judges 8:18 B reads εἰς ὁμοίωμα where A reads ὡς εἶδος μορφή. In describing two men they are both said to look exactly like the son of a king. The Hebrew word it represents is defined in the Lexicon as *Form* or *Figure*, and without question the word here means the external appearance or form.

Isaiah 44:13 speaks of the carpenter forming an image to put into the house and mentions the fact that he "shapeth it after the figure of a man ὡς μορφῇν ἀνδρὸς according to the beauty of a man." Here it translates the Hebrew term which means pattern, image, figure, and clearly external form or figure is meant. Job 4:16 speaks of a vision of the night in which a spirit stood before Eliphaz. "It stood still (he says) and I did not understand it or know it, I looked and there was no form (μορφή) before my eyes." Here the word translates the Hebrew word for figure or appearance and evidently means external form or appearance. Tobit (1:13) declares that the Most High gave him χάριν καὶ μορφῇν before his king. In this instance the word can only have the meaning above referred to as sometimes occurring in classical Greek, beautiful form or appearance. 4 Macc. 15:4 speaking of parents and children mentions the ψυχῆς τε καὶ μορφῆς ὁμοιότητα where the meaning is nearly that of body (σῶμα) and clearly refers to the external physical form.

The word occurs several times in Daniel. In 4:33 Th. reads μορφή while the Septuagint reads δόξα. The form of the king is said to have been restored to him and means that he received again the appearance and form of man instead of his former



grotesque appearance of a beast. In 5:6 Th. again reads μορφή while the Septuagint reads *δρασις*. This passage is describing the countenance of Belshazzar which changed at the writing on the wall. In 5:9-10 we have the same words repeated in Th. while the Septuagint has nothing to correspond. In 7:28 the same words occur, this time applied to Daniel, and the Septuagint has *ἔξις* (a habit either of body or mind). In all these passages the Aramaic word is the one which the Gesenius-Kautzsch Lexicon defines as *Gesichtsfarbe*. Daniel 3:19 is the most interesting of all the Septuagint passages. Here the Septuagint has μορφή and Th. has ὄψις. The Hebrew word is the same as the word used in Gen. 1:27 to denote the image of God in which man was created. The passage relates how the (μορφή τοῦ προσώπου) form of the countenance of Nebuchadrezzar was changed with fury against the three Hebrews who refused to worship him. (Cf. HAUPT-MEYER on Phil. p. 71).

Thus it is clear that the uniform meaning of the word in the Septuagint is that of form or figure with the strong tendency to approach the natural meaning of σχῆμα<sup>87</sup>.

Outside of the passage under consideration the word occurs but once in the New Testament, and that in Mark 16:12, written about 125 A. D. It here means the external form or figure including the appearance, as Luke 24:13-31 upon which the passage in Mark is based clearly shows.

The word occurs several times in the Apostolic Fathers. In Diog. 2:3 not only μορφή but also the verb μορφώσαντες is used in reference to the change which various materials undergo, as under the hand of the stonecutter, silversmith, or potter, or other artificer, they are made into the idols which the heathen worship. The verb represents the transforming process and the noun the shape or form of the idol which is made. That such is its meaning admits of no question. In *Hermas Vis.* III. 10, 2 and 9; 11, 1 reference is made to three figures which had appeared to Hermas in a vision. These were symbolical and of course non-material, but in speaking of them as μορφαὶ the representation is clearly that of physical form or outline. In *Sim.* IX. 1:1 a reference is made to the message which had been given to Hermas by the spirit which had spoken to him ἐν μορφῇ τῆς ἐκκλησίας. This passage refers back to the vision (*Vision. III.*) in which the church had appeared to him in the form of a building, and just as in the preceding

<sup>87</sup> σχῆμα occurs in the Septuagint but once and that in Isaiah 3:17. Its meaning is here obscure. See Brown-Driver-Briggs on *Poik*

passages, though non-material, the mental picture is clearly that of a physical material form or shape.

In the Clementine Homilies XVII. 3:7,8,10 occurs a very explicit and illuminating use of this term. Peter is represented as insisting upon the anthropomorphic conception of God. When his opponent objects that if God has a *μορφή* he also has a *σχῆμα*. Peter accepts the implication and says that he has in fact not only the same *μορφή* but also the same *σχῆμα* as man. He then proceeds to say that because of his splendor he is invisible, but that man is his visible image. His possession of limbs and eyes and other organs of the body are not necessary to him for "He has shape (*μορφή*) and he has every limb primarily and solely for beauty's sake and not for use." (cf. *Secrets of Enoch* 65:1).

In view of all these passages the conclusion seems unavoidable that by *μορφή* we must understand, not on the one side, merely a synonym for *σχῆμα*, nor on the other the essential attributes of the thing or person, so that the possession of the *μορφή* of any person or thing involves essential identity with that person or thing; but we must understand the term to refer to the characteristic mode of being or existence of a given object or person<sup>38</sup>.

It is held by many commentators, especially those of theological propensities, that the word must here have a peculiar application since God can not be thought of under the concept of shape or form. (See e. g. VINCENT, and LIGHTFOOT *ad. loc.*) This however is to confuse interpretation with dogmatics. It is not at all clear that such a conception was foreign to Paul. It is scarcely to be doubted that he, just as his contemporaries, regarded God from an anthropomorphic rather than from a philosophic point of view, and that he conceived of the personality of God as invested with an externalized organization fitted to his transcendent being is not impossible. That such was the representation of contemporary Judaism does not admit of question. As early as the book of Daniel, 165 B. C., (not to speak of the general Old Testament view; see Gen. 1:27 and cf. GUNKEL, *Schöpfung und Chaos* pp. 9-12) God was conceived as existing in a body whose outline resembled the hu-

<sup>38</sup>The discussion of Lightfoot concerning the derivatives of *μορφή* and *σχῆμα* need not be considered. In general the distinction which he makes may be allowed to stand, and he has shown that the New Testament does distinguish more or less sharply between the two terms. His discussion, however, is subject to the same criticism which has already been advanced, and must be corrected in the light of it. Theological prepossession has vitiated his exegetical method and prevents him from seeing (1) that the term is used in a derivative sense and (2) that the conception lies much closer to the original physical basis of the term than he will allow. See especially Mark 9:2 and parallels, and 2 Cor. 3:18.

man form, differing only in the majesty, and glory of His person and raiment, and the magnificence of His surroundings. He sat on a throne, the hair of His head was like wool for whiteness and purity, and His raiment was white as snow. The throne on which He sat was of fiery flames and had wheels of burning fire. Fire flowed from before Him and thousands of thousands ministered to Him. Judgment was administered on the basis of records opened before Him (Dan. 7:9-10). The same conception is to be found also in the book of *Enoch* (71:5-13), and is expressed in almost identical terms. Ten thousand times ten thousand minister to the Head of Days whose head is white and pure as wool, whose raiment is indescribable. He dwells in a house of crystals girt round with flames of living fire. In *Enoch* 14:9-25 we have a fuller description along the same general line. God who is called the Great Glory sat on a throne whose appearance was as hoar-frost, its circuit as a shining sun, and the voices of cherubim. From beneath the great throne came streams of fire so that it was impossible to look thereon. The throne was situated in a large house built of flames of fire whose splendor and magnificence and extent were indescribable. "None of the angels could enter and could behold the face of the Honored and Glorious One and no flesh could behold Him. A flaming fire was round about Him and a great fire stood before Him and none of those who were around Him could draw nigh Him." A similar conception underlies *Enoch* 46:1,2; 47:3; 60:2; 89:22 and 90:20. The *Assumption of Moses* from the first quarter of the first century reflects the same conception (see 10:3,7; 12:13), as does also the *Apocalypse of Baruch* 21:3ff; 59:3ff, only it is not so explicitly stated. The Christian writing, *The Ascension of Isaiah*, though written not before the latter part of the first century A. D., in many points reflects Jewish conceptions. It treats elaborately of the seven heavens and the character of their inhabitants. God is there conceived in human form but of surpassing and unapproachable glory. See especially 9:34-42; 10:7ff; 11:32. (Cf. also *Secrets of Enoch*, 20:3; 21:1; 22:23; 49:3 and 3 Macc. 2:15; Jos. con. Ap. 2:22,2).

It is clear from these passages that a common and perhaps the prevailing conception of God in Judaism pictured Him in the form or figure of a man. (cf. BRÜCKNER, *Die Entstehung der Paulinischen Christologie*, p. 68). It was not so much the outline of His figure as the glory (δόξα) in respect to which He differed from men. As the writer of I Timothy 6:16 puts it, "He dwelt in light unapproachable who was unseen and invisible to human eye." No one would desire to hold the writers of these various books to an exactly literal understanding of that which they wrote, but it can scarcely be without significance that the constant representation por-

trays God in these terms. Although the writer of *Enoch* (14:16) declares that the splendor and magnificence of the heavenly throne and mansion are indescribable and the face of the "Honored and Glorious One" invisible, there is not the slightest hint that this was due to their intangible or formless character. It was due simply to their transcendent and inexpressible splendor and glory.

For early Christianity as well as for Judaism the same general conceptions held true. Heaven was a place above the earth which was invisible. In it dwelt God whom only a few chosen spirits had been privileged to see. As in the case of the writers already referred to, the conception is one of decided anthropomorphism<sup>90</sup>. Paul seems also to have occupied the same general position. The manner in which he speaks of his visions and revelations (2 Cor. 12:1-4) is simply a duplicate of that which occurs in Daniel (7:1, 8:1ff, 15ff; 9:1; 10:1), *Enoch* (13:8ff; 14:8ff; 37:1; 71:5ff *et passim*), *Apocalypse of Baruch* (6:2; 13:1; 22:1; 46:7), *Ascension of Isaiah* (6:10; 7:3ff; 8:1f), *Assumption of Moses* (12:4) and IV *Ezra* (8:20; 14:49). (Cf. CHARLES, *Apocalypse of Baruch*, 46:7, note). His general view is indicated also in I Thess. 4:14ff; Gal. 4:26; I Cor. 15:8, 40ff, 51ff; II Cor. 5:1ff; 12:1-4; Rom. 1:20, 23; 8:34; 14:10; Eph. 1:3ff; 3:9ff; Col. 3:1; Phil. 3:20ff; 2:10ff.

But there are several facts which indicate that the grossly anthropomorphic view reflected in some of these passages is not to be attributed to Paul.

In the first place it should be noted, that in the greater number of cases in which *μορφῇ* occurs it is not used in reference to God but with respect to other objects of thought. We have then to ask not what the term meant but what idea is intended to be conveyed by the anthropomorphic phraseology resulting from the application of the term to God. In the Clementines it seems to be true that the author accepts a more or less crass idea of God and regards him as little more than a large man who is invisible to the physical eye. But there is no valid reason for denying that Justin thought of God as immaterial and invisible, not localized in an external physical organization. It may also be agreed that the thought of the various writers as it is reflected above is not as gross as it appears. It is more probable that they picture to their minds a mode of existence which they express in sense terms, but at the same time as they in fact deny to it visibility, they by implication recognize their own anthropomorphism, and deny to that mode of existence a physically sensible character.

<sup>90</sup>See Mark 10:40; 14:62; Matt. 20:33; 22:44; Acts 2:33; 5:31; 7:55, 56; I Peter 3:23; I Tim. 1:17; 6:16, and for very explicit representations see Rev. *passim* and especially *Ascension of Isaiah* 9:34-42.

In the second place it appears on consideration that to make μορφή in the present passage mean merely form or figure would be to limit the passage to the expression of an extremely jejune thought. Of what possible significance it could be to exist in the figure of God when that figure, so far as it is expressed at all, is conceived to resemble the human body, is not easy to see. But that is simply to say that we must turn to the philosophic meaning to interpret our passage.

There is no *a priori* reason against this for we recall that in the time of Paul the philosophic usage was more than three hundred years old and could scarcely have failed to have percolated into common thought and language in no small degree. But when we look for the philosophic meaning we must be careful that we get hold of what it really was. We have seen above that, on the one side, it included more than the mere external outline, but that Lightfoot had fallen into error in thinking that the only alternative was to make the word mean essential attribute. But it has appeared I think in our criticism of Lightfoot, that it meant rather the *mode of existence* of any given object or person. On the one side it excludes mere outline and on the other essential identity. It is in itself a term, implying externalization but as applied to God it is felt to be anthropomorphic and is used only as the best expression to set forth a conception of God in personal terms. (Cf. John "God is spirit," and yet note his numerous anthropomorphisms). When now we understand the term properly we see that it is exactly fitting to the present passage. The great humiliation of Christ consisted not in changing on the one hand the mere outlines of his body, or on the other in casting aside his essential attributes, but in the giving up by the self-identical Christ of the mode and conditions of existence which were those of God himself and taking those of man<sup>40</sup>. In the one condition he had open before him prerogatives and privileges in connection with God befitting his dignity. He chose to accept the human mode and conditions of existence with the career which it involved.

The purpose of this essay would not be advanced by a consideration of the exact thought of this entire passage. We are not concerned with an exposition of the entire Pauline Christology in detail. We need only consider the other expression which has to do with the mode and conditions of Christ's pre-existent state. Nor is it essential that this be considered as fully as the expression which has just occupied our attention. We have already discovered the fundamental conception which Paul entertained con-

---

<sup>40</sup>At this point the apostle's conception of the spiritual and physical or psychical body should be compared. 1 Cor. 15:35 ff.

cerning the nature of the pre-existent Christ. We may now ask briefly what further light the expression οὐκ ἀρπαγμὸν....θεῶ, furnishes on this point.

In the first place we may reject as entirely groundless every interpretation which makes Paul say that the τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῶ did not belong to the pre-existent Christ and was not possible to him, but that it was appointed for him as a reward for his self-abnegation (So WEISS, *Bib. Theol. of N. T.*, Vol. II, p. 101; BRIGGS, *Messiah of the Apostles*, p. 180; BEYSCHLAG, *N. T. Th.*, II, p. 88), Such an interpretation has no support whatever in this passage, and can only be entertained by one who refuses, because of dogmatic presupposition, to allow the apostle to express his own thought. It is singularly arbitrary. The choice must lie between making τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῶ essentially equivalent to ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ (So Thayer on μορφῇ and apparently Vincent, *Int. Crit. Com.*, p. 84f), and something which lay before Christ as an immediate possibility because of his being ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ. In this case it would represent a higher condition than that which he already occupied, carrying with it greater prerogatives than those he already enjoyed.

The decision of this question rests partly upon our decision concerning some other points. Are we to understand εἶναι in the sense of a copulative verb or is it to be understood as having the meaning "to exist"? If we decide with Meyer, Ellicott, Weiss and Vincent for the latter, it would seem to follow that it must be something which Christ already enjoyed<sup>41</sup>. For (1) not only would it be difficult to conceive of the attainment of any state of essential being as ἀρπαγμὸν, but (2) the ascription to anyone even to Christ of the possibility of rising from a lower state of being to that of God, or the permitting of one to entertain such an idea, is more than the apostle's general point of view or any other particular statement of his reflects or warrants. If, on the other hand, the verb εἶναι be taken in its more probable sense as copula, the question whether the ἴσα θεῶ was already experienced by Christ or lay before him as a prize to be won is left undecided.

We must next consider the meaning of ἀρπαγμὸν. We may dismiss as quite out of the range of possibility the conception of Meyer which makes this refer to the effort to gain worldly honor

---

<sup>41</sup>I regard the discovery in this passage of an implied antithesis between Christ and Adam (e. g. as Briggs, Barton) as a sheer importation, absolutely unsustained by the evidence.

and fame which Christ renounced in his humiliation. This Meyer does on the basis of the conception that *ἀρπαγμὸν* must be taken in its active sense. Whether it is so to be taken or not his interpretation is singularly perverse. The precise meaning of the term is somewhat obscure. The formation of nouns with the termination *μος* usually gives to them the active meaning. There is but one example of this noun in a profane author and that (Plutarch, *Moral*, p. 12 A) is apparently used in an active sense. Other passages in Greek later than Paul in which it has been noted (see VINCENT, *op. cit.*, *ad. loc.*) reflect the passive meaning. Other nouns in *μος* (as *θεσμὸς χρησμὸς* see THAYER and cf. VINCENT) bear the passive meaning. The evidence obtainable as well as the whole context of the passage, seems to suggest that here the word has the passive force and means "a thing to be grasped" or "laid hold upon."

Whether now we are to understand it to refer to something already possessed or something possible of attainment is slightly indicated in the latter part of the passage. The taking of the form of a servant and being found in the likeness of a man seems to carry with it certain experiences which the incarnate Christ voluntarily, but not of logical necessity, assumed. The balance of thought would seem to suggest that the retaining of the form of God carried with it certain possibilities which Christ relinquished. That is to say, in the form of God there was open to him one career but he deliberately turned from that and taking the form of a servant chose another career. But against this it may be urged that the point upon which the apostle is laying emphasis is the extreme humiliation of Christ in changing from *μορφῇ θεοῦ* to *μορφῇ δούλου* and the sharpness of the contrast introduced by *ἀλλὰ* as well as the depth of the humiliation would be heightened if the prerogatives of the *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ* were not as yet a mere possibility but were already his own. Since the humiliation is clearly the central thought of the apostle, I think it must lead us to decide in favor of the latter alternative. In that case the *ἀρπαγμὸν* refers to something which Christ already held, but did not desire to lay hold upon, to eagerly retain.

We must at this point decide how we are to understand the expression *ἴσα θεῷ*. It can scarcely be maintained that it is identical with the expression *ἴσος θεῷ*. Lightfoot recognizes the distinction between the two and says that the latter refers to the *person*, the former to the *attributes*. Although the article is not used with *θεῷ*, in consequence of which exact identity could scarcely be supposed to be affirmed, it is unnecessary to dispute

Lightfoot's suggestion for the latter expression. But when he defines the  $\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\alpha\iota\ \iota\sigma\alpha\ \theta\epsilon\omega$  as representing an equality of attributes we must demur. Here again dogmatic theology and not exegesis is at work. Just what Vincent means by "existence in the way of equality with God" is difficult to say. He does not state in what respect there is equality, but apparently implies (*op. cit.*, p. 86) that he understands it to mean "equality of being." But this is tautological of the previous expression and what he understands by the term is still a matter of question. His discussion of the distinction which Beyschlag maintains as between  $\theta\epsilon\delta\varsigma$  and  $\delta\ \theta\epsilon\delta\varsigma$  seems to indicate that he understands it as practically equivalent to  $\iota\sigma\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omega$  without being open to the objection that it reflects a dualism as between God and Christ. That is, he seems to regard it as making Christ substantially God.

The choice of the word  $\delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\upsilon$  to express the condition unto which Christ came when he emptied himself, together with the fact that Paul has in I Cor. 10:4 already assigned to Christ a mediatorial activity in creation suggests strongly that there is in this passage a reference to certain prerogatives which Christ enjoyed. Paul can hardly mean to say, however, that these prerogatives and powers were equal to those of God, for not only does the apostle uniformly subordinate Christ to God, but even here the lordship into possession of which Christ comes as a result of his humiliation is a gift of God ( $\theta\epsilon\delta\varsigma$  not  $\pi\alpha\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$ ). Since it was in consequence of Christ's self humiliation that he was exalted as lord above every creature, it seems hardly probable that the apostle conceived him to have possessed even this lordship prior to his humiliation. On the other side, the entire Pauline thought as well as the clear implications of the present passage will not allow us to interpret  $\iota\sigma\alpha\ \theta\epsilon\omega$  as "equality of essential being with God." The thought of the apostle seems best exhibited in making the phrase refer to the *conditions* of Christ's pre-existent life. With this the apostle associates certain prerogatives and powers, but the equality pertains only to the conditions of existence in which these were enjoyed. I regard the phrase  $\iota\sigma\alpha\ \theta\epsilon\omega$  then as the practical equivalent of  $\epsilon\upsilon\ \mu\omicron\rho\phi\eta\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ . In this latter phrase the emphasis is upon the mode of being or existence, the conditions being implied. In the former phrase the emphasis is on the conditions of existence the mode being implied because already stated.

We must now inquire as to the origin of this conception. How did Paul reach it? What elements contribute to it?

According to I Cor. 15:1-3 Paul had received from the primi-



tive church that Christ died for sin according to the scriptures and it is obvious to inquire whether he also received from them the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence. It must be said that we have no evidence that the pre-existence of Jesus was a dogma of primitive Christianity<sup>42</sup>. The chief elements in the Messianic conception of the early chapters of Acts are; that he was approved unto the nation by mighty works which God wrought in him (2:22; 10:38) and the same spirit which operated in him to do these mighty powers made him holy and righteous (3:14; 4:27. Cf. 7:52; 9:14). God had also placed his approval upon him by raising him from the dead (2:24, 31, 33; 3:15; 4:10; 5:30. Cf. 4:33; 10:40; 13:30). In addition to this God had exalted him to his right hand (2:33; 5:31) and had made him not only Christ (3:20; 13:23, 32, 33. Cf. 2:36) but also Lord (2:34-36; 5:42; 9:22). He must remain in the heavens until the final restoration of all things, (3:21) whence he had sent the Holy Spirit upon his disciples (2:33; 3:21). He is the power working in his disciples to perform miracles (3:16; 4:10), is the author of life, probably resurrection life (3:15. Cf. 5:31; 7:56), and is to be the judge of the quick and the dead (10:42). The evidence seems quite clear that Paul's earliest conception joined immediately on to that of the primitive church. According to the representation of Acts 13:16-40 his sermon at Pisidian Antioch did not differ in the main from the sermons of the apostles in the early chapters of Acts. There can be seen the beginning, however, of the philosophy of the death of Christ which he later developed so fully. His first step forward is that as Christ passed through and conquered death (that is, was raised from the dead) so he can deliver all who accept him (vss. 33 and 38, but cf. 3:15; 5:31; 7:56). In Acts 17:3 he goes a step further "opening" (the scriptures) and alleging that it *behooved* the Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead." Cf. also 26:23. That this in the main features is a correct representation seems clear from first and second Thessalonians (see especially I Thess. 1:10, 11; 1:3; 2:19; 3:13; 4:15; 5:1, 2, 10, 23; II Thess. 1:7; 2:1, 8, 14).

As already indicated above, Paul told the Corinthians that he had received the doctrine of Christ's death for sin according to the scriptures from the early church. By some the term servant *παῖς* which is used of Jesus in these early chapters (3:13, 26; 4:27, 30) is thought to reflect this conception and to go back to the 53d chap-

<sup>42</sup> Baldensperger, *op. cit.* p. 145-6, says that in respect of the pre-existence of the Messiah as in many other things, Christianity simply took over Jewish tradition. Paul's emphasis is at first upon the risen Christ and he seems only gradually to have attained the fully developed Christology of the imprisonment epistles. For a very stimulating but overdrawn and frequently fanciful presentation, see WERNLE, *Die Anfaenge*, etc., pp. 203-205.

ter of Isaiah. (See KNOWLING on Acts 3:13 and page 119ff). This however is not supported by the evidence. It seems probable that such an important point of the message would not have been omitted from the discourses which originally contained it and would have been reflected in these chapters in some explicit terms. In addition to this, the term *παῖς* is used of David (4:25) in much the same way that it is used elsewhere of Jesus, apparently in an untechnical and general sense<sup>48</sup>. (Cf. *Didache* 9:2, 3; 10:2).

Of course the testimony of Paul concerning that which he had received from the early church can not be impeached, nor does it admit of a different interpretation from that suggested above (Cf. FEINE, *Eine Vorkanonische Ueberlieferung des Lukas*, p. 229ff). It is not necessary however to suppose that the Christological doctrine of the church had remained undeveloped before it reached Paul. On the contrary, we must allow for at least enough development to explain at once Paul's statement concerning the transmission to him from the early church, of the conception of the sacrificial death of Christ and its almost total absence from the early chapters of Acts. Such a development would be only natural. The conception may possibly be contained in germ in such passages as 2:23, 28; 3:18, 19; 4:12; 7:52; see especially 8:32. It should also be borne in mind that not only did Paul not hear this first preaching, but seems, as do these early chapters, to have begun his own preaching by laying the emphasis upon the messiahship of Jesus as evidenced in the scripture. But the apostle neither hints, nor does the record even if we include the epistles which reflect primitive Christian thought, afford the slightest suggestion, that the doctrine of pre-existence was held by the early church.

We must conclude, then, that Paul's doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ was not transmitted to him as a tradition of the church, and accepted on the basis of such authority.

Nor does it seem more successful to attempt to find the source of the doctrine in the Alexandrian conception of the heavenly man. As we have already shown, this conception had no influence upon his doctrine of the second Adam, and it has even less claim to our attention here. It was shown in the previous discussion that this conception was a very uncertain and hazy one, being as a matter of fact scarcely more than a formal rhetorical term. Grant that

<sup>48</sup>The proposal to translate *παῖς* by son (see SANDAY, *Hast. Dict. Art. Son of God*, Vol. IV., p. 574) and thus to find in it a metaphysical relationship and pre-existence cannot be seriously considered. This conception begins to appear in the Apostolic Fathers (see *Martyrdom of Polycarp*, 14:1, 3; *Clement* 59:2-4; *Ep. to Diogn.* 8:9-11. Cf. *Ignatius Eph.* 7:2; *Magn.* 6:1; *Smyrn.* 1:1) and by the time of Justin has reached a high development (see *Apology* 2:6).

it expresses a clearly defined conception it is not the conception which Paul has for he thinks of Christ as pre-existent, not as man but as a divine being whose relations ally him to God. Further than this, this Alexandrian doctrine is in no way connected with the Messiah. The *Sibylline Oracles* which may be ascribed to a date before Paul, do not reflect the conception of a Messiah at all. Philo makes but little of the Messiah. The terms in which he describes him are very indefinite, but certainly reflect nothing beyond the conception of an ordinary man chosen to perform the specific task of reuniting Israel and leading it to triumph. (See *de cherub* 1, cf. 3; *de execratione* 8, 9; *de prem. et poen.* 15-20). Nor can I regard it as more probable that the logos conception contributed to Paul's thought here in any appreciable degree. After everything is said there seems no clear evidence that Philo thought of the logos in any way approaching the conception of a separate personality. However much certain passages would verbally support such an interpretation, it cannot be maintained. As I read Philo his conception of the logos cannot be better expressed briefly than in the words of Drummond (*Philo Judaeus*, II, p. 273). "From first to last the Logos (in Philo) is the thought of God dwelling subjectively in the infinite mind, planted out and made objective in the universe," or, (as he phrases it on p. 223) "permanently impressed on the universe." Paul's is unequivocally and definitely a personal conception. It is farther from Philo at this point than from Palestinian thought.

The effort has been made to find ground for the conception in the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls held to be current in Judaism. The existence of such a doctrine in Alexandrianism Judaism in the time of Paul is not to be denied. It appears clearly in Philo (*de somno* 1:22; *de gigan.* 3, 4) and is probably reflected in other writers. It has usually been held to be reflected in Wisdom, 8:19, 20, but Porter (*Yale Studies*, p. 146) demurs and thinks that there is no more argument in this passage for the pre-existence of the soul than there is for the pre-existence of the body, and his position certainly is not without plausibility. *Secrets of Enoch*, according to the translation of Charles, declares (23:5) that all souls were eternally (one ms. has "for eternity") created before the foundation of the world. But Bonwetsch translates "prepared" instead of created. If this be the correct translation (and in favor of it cf. 23:4; 49:2; 53:5) pre-existence is probably not to be thought of (cf. DALMAN, *Words of Jesus*, pp. 104ff, 245ff).

If we grant, however, its currency in Alexandrian thought it does not necessarily follow that it was frequent or at all present in Judaism. To infer it for the latter because of its presence in the former as Barton does (J. B. L. 1902, pp. 78-91) is a serious

error. Positive evidence for the existence of this doctrine in Palestinian Judaism during the period in question is very slight. According to Weber (pp. 204, 205, 217-20) and Charles (on *Secrets of Enoch* 23:5) it was the ordinary doctrine of later Rabbinic thought. This may probably be allowed though one desires the attestation of better authority to be sure of it. Josephus says that the doctrine of pre-existence of souls was a dogma of the Essenes. They, however, can hardly be said, even if Josephus' statement be accepted without reservation, to be representative of current Jewish thought. The passages in the New Testament which have frequently been supposed to reflect such a conception are themselves obscure and capable of a different interpretation, besides being in writings clearly affected by non-Jewish thought<sup>44</sup>. The best representative of orthodox Judaism in the first century is probably the *Apocalypse of Baruch*<sup>45</sup>. In 23:4, 5 it is said that when Adam sinned "and death was decreed against those who should be born, then the multitude of those who should be born was numbered, and for that number a place was prepared where the living might dwell and the dead might be guarded. Unless, therefore, the number aforesaid is fulfilled, the creature will not live again (for my spirit is the creator of life), and Sheol will receive the dead." And again in 48:6 "Thou carest for the number which pass away that they may be preserved, and thou preparest an abode for those that are to be." It is clear now that in neither of these two passages is there reflected a doctrine of pre-existence. According to both of them, those who are to be born are known to God, and a place is prepared for them according to their number. In the first passage, at least, it would have been natural if the writer held to the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls to have mentioned it. But not only does he not do this, but he even seems to exclude such a conception by the clear reflection of the idea of the foreknowledge of God.

In IV *Ezra* 4:33-43 we have a reference which in part seems at first sight to reflect the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls. In verses 41-42 we read "In the grave the chambers of souls are like the womb; for like as a woman that travaileth maketh haste to escape the anguish of the travail: even so do these places haste to deliver those things that are committed unto them from the

---

<sup>44</sup>For a good discussion of the passages in the New Testament, see Barton *op. cit.* and cf. the literature there cited.

<sup>45</sup>According to Abrahams, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April, 1904, p. 507, Grenfell in the third volume of the Oxyrhynchus papyri 403 says that Baruch was originally written in Greek. If this should prove to be true it might be necessary to change our conception of the representative Jewish character of the Apocalypse.

beginning" (the Latin reads *ab initio*). Just what this expression "from the beginning" means is difficult to say, but the clause is probably distributive and means that from the beginning there were these chambers for the reception of the dead. That it does not refer to the doctrine in question is made very clear not only by the first half of the quotation but also by the whole context and especially verse 35. Cf. also the *Apocalypse of John* 7:13ff; 6:9, 10<sup>46</sup>.

The idea that the number of the souls of men, or the men, who will be, are known to God is of a piece with the thought that the world has been created on behalf of the righteous in Israel (*Baruch* 14:19; 15:7; 21:24) or as is more frequently said in behalf of his people. This latter thought is well stated in the *Assumption of Moses* 1:12 "For he hath created the world on behalf of his people." See also IV *Ezra* 6:55-59; 7:11; cf. also 8:1, 44; *Hermas*, *Vis.* II, 4:1; *Vis.* I, 1:6 and *Mand.* 12:4.

This is all to be interpreted as expressing not the actual pre-existence of the souls of man or of the men themselves, but only that all things are known beforehand to God. This is well expressed in the *Assumption of Moses* 12:5 as follows: "Yea all things which are to be in this earth the Lord hath foreseen and lo! they are brought forward into the light." And again in 12:13, "For God will go forth who hath foreseen all things forever." Cf. 12:4.

We must conclude that no evidence has yet been advanced which may by fair interpretation render it at all probable that the Judaism of Paul's day held a doctrine of the pre-existence of souls.

Even if it could be conclusively shown that a doctrine of a pre-existence of souls was held, that is not identical with a personal pre-existence and the latter would still need explanation. On this point the work of too many writers suffers from failure to make any discrimination and their work is thus not of much value.

But Judaism contains two conceptions which are of more pertinence to our inquiry concerning the origin of Paul's thought of the pre-existence of Christ.

It is a commonplace of scholarship that even before the Christian era Judaism had developed a rather sharp distinction between "this age" and "the coming age." The latter was to be ushered in by the setting up of the Messianic kingdom with all of its splendor and blessings for those who were fortunate enough to be allowed entrance thereto.

---

<sup>46</sup>The interpretation by which Charles and Baldensperger *op. cit.* p. 149 derive the pre-existence of Moses from *Assumption of Moses* 1:14 cannot be maintained.

But in addition to this distinction between the present and the future there had been developed, especially by the apocalyptic writers, another distinction respecting the same fundamental thought. I refer to the lower and the upper or heavenly world. The factors which contributed to this conception we are not now concerned with, but only with the fact of its currency in the thought.

It was developed apparently in connection with the growing conception of God<sup>47</sup>. He was no longer thought of as a local tribal divinity but as the one and only God of the entire universe. The conception of his oneness, his holiness and transcendentness had gradually removed him from the earth into a world of his own. Here he was surrounded by his angels and ministers and maintained a heavenly kingdom and court. It was this world which had been open to the vision of the patriarchs and seers who speak in the apocalypses. It was this world also which contained the mansions for the blessed, into the enjoyment of which they would come, when the Messiah should set up his kingdom and the present evil age be brought to an end. Thus it was not to grow out of the present but was to be realized by the destruction of the present. It is in fact the invisible eternal world which only awaits the appointed time until it shall be made manifest. For a few of the most striking passages see, *Enoch* 1:2; 14:9ff; 46:1, 2; 71: 5-8; *Apocalypse of Baruch* 21:3ff; 59:3ff; *Testaments, Levi*, 3 and 5; *Ascension of Isaiah*, 9:34-42.

Paul had the same general view. He looked forward to the future as the time of glory and happiness for the righteous (I Thess. 4:15ff; I Cor. 6:14; 15:12; Rom. 5:10; 6:4ff, etc.) and thought of it as coming only with the end of the present age. But that world which in the future was to be manifested, already existed, for he himself had been taken up into it (II Cor. 12:2ff) and had seen such glories as were not to be uttered. In it there awaited him the eternal house not made with hands which he should in the future occupy (II Cor. 5:1). The present age was soon to pass away but he had his eye on the eternal unseen world. "For the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal" (II Cor. 4:18). In this unseen world dwelt the eternal God whose eternal purposes for men were being wrought through Jesus Christ (Rom. 16:25-27; I Cor. 2:7), who as a member of this heavenly world had shown himself to the apostle.

But more definitely we find in at least some circles of Judaism<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup>See an article by the present writer in the *Biblical World*, Jan., 1905, pp. 30-42.

<sup>48</sup>MATHEWS, *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, p. 62, expresses

the conception of the actual personal pre-existence of the Messiah<sup>49</sup>. The doctrine of the Messiah as reflected in the literature we may rapidly review.

The passage in Daniel (7:13) is usually said to have been intended by the writer to be understood only in a typical sense (cf. Dan. 7:18, 22) but if so it was soon personalized, this apparently being done even by the LXX.. (Cf. BOUSSET, *op. cit.*, p. 250, note 4; BALDENSPERGER, *op. cit.*, p. 134ff). According to this view the origin of the conception of the personal pre-existent Messiah is simply in a misinterpretation of the Daniel passage. But Gunkel, (*Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1899, pp. 582-90) expresses the opinion that Son of Man is a technical term which uniformly means Messiah, and that this passage in Daniel reflects a tradition from some unknown source respecting a personal Messiah; (so also SMEND, *Z. A. W.* 1885, p. 248). Bousset also (*op. cit.*, p. 253), thinks that it is impossible to suppose that all the later doctrine concerning the Son of Man is due simply to a misunderstanding of this Daniel passage. He thinks that the Son of Man is a combination of the Jewish Messiah and a pre-existent heavenly being whose origin and descent is as yet unknown to us. (Cf. BEHRMANN, *Hand Kommentar* on Dan. 7:13, 14). While there is no clear evidence of foreign influence, as both Gunkel and Bousset would allow, one cannot but regard with sympathy their endeavor to find some supramundane being in connection with the development of this conception. Such a being has been sought in various ways, not only in Babylonian mythology (see HOMMEL, *Exp. Times*, Vol. XI, pp. 341-45) but also in Persian eschatology (VÖLTER, *Z. N. W.* 1902, pp. 173-4). One can only say that so far at least every such attempt has been without avail<sup>50</sup>.

The passage (46:1, 2) in the Similitudes of *Enoch* in which the personal Messiah, the Son of Man, is introduced is unquestionably based upon the Daniel passage and seems to form the first stage of advance (if we except the LXX) beyond the conception reflected by the latter. It reads as follows. "And there I saw One who had a head of days, and his head was white like wool, and with Him was another being whose countenance had the appearance of a man and his face was full of graciousness like one

a timely caution against confining Apocalyptic to too small a circle in Judaism. There was, he says, no sect of apocalyptic Quietists.

<sup>49</sup>See BOUSSET, *Die Religion des Judentums*, pp. 248-55; BALDENSPERGER, *Die Messianisch-Apokalyptischen Hoffnungen des Judentums*, pp. 131ff, 144ff; SCHURER, *Geschichte*, etc., II. 527-30; contra, DALMAN, *The Words of Jesus*, pp. 128-33, 299-303.

<sup>50</sup>On speculations concerning such a being, the Urmensch, see BOUSSET, *op. cit.* pp. 346-49.

of the holy angels. And I asked the angel who went with me and showed me all the hidden things concerning that Son of Man, who he was, and whence he was, and why he went with the Head of Days"? It is clear from this passage that the Son of Man, the Messiah, is conceived under the form of a human being who differs only in the graciousness of his countenance. It is not perfectly clear here, however, that the Messiah was thought of as pre-existent either actually or ideally<sup>51</sup>, but his pre-existence is made clear by 48:3, 6; 39:6; 62:7; 70:1. This actual pre-existence accords well with his attributes of universal dominion and unlimited authority (47:3; 62:6; 69:27).

Although in many respects the conception of the Messiah here reflected is unique<sup>52</sup>, it is not without resemblances and apparently without influence in later Jewish writings. The Messiah of the *Psalms of Solomon* though rising out of the community (17:23) has many features which ally him to the supernatural (17:23; 17:41, 42, 46, 47; 18:6)<sup>53</sup>. The conception of the Messiah which is reflected in this XVII Psalm seems in many respects identical with that which may be termed the popular conception as it appears in the Gospels. (Matt. 1:1; Mark 10:47; 11:10; 12:35; Luke 1:69; 2:5, 11; John 7:27, 31, 42; 12:34. There is probably nowhere given us in explicit terms a truer picture of the Messiah as he was conceived generally in the time of Jesus than here. It is clear, however, from at least parts of the gospels that the conception of the Messiah was a somewhat unsettled one, and with him was associated a certain degree of uncertainty and mysteriousness. He was to be of the line of David (Matt. 1:1; 15:22; 9:27; 12:23; 20:30, 31; 22:42; Mark 10:47, 48; 11:10; 12:35; Luke 1:32; John 7:42), but apparently was in some way distinct from, and superior to, the rest of the community.

In IV *Ezra* the Messiah is conceived as a pre-existent, heavenly being<sup>54</sup> in the form of a man while at the same time, at least in one passage, he is supposed to be of the seed of David. Thus 12:32: "Hic est unctus, quem reseruavit altissimus in finem (according to Schürer II, 527, note 14, all oriental versions insert here, qui orietur ex semine David) ad eos et impietates ipsorum

<sup>51</sup>Tov, *Judaism and Christianity*, p. 364, thinks that we have here only an ideal pre-existence.

<sup>52</sup>It is probably not so unique as Charles (*in loco*) makes it. Baldensperger, *op. cit.* p. 138ff, apparently thinks that it became the ruling conception of Judaism. The evidence for this, however, is not altogether conclusive.

<sup>53</sup>Charles, note on *Apocalypse of Baruch*, 30:1, thinks that 18:6 reflects the notion of pre-existence. But see Ryle and James *ad loc.*

<sup>54</sup>See also *Apocalypse of John*, 12:1-6, and PORTER, *Art. Revelation, Book of, Hastings Dictionary*.



arguet illos et de iniustitiis ipsorum et infulsiet coram ipsis spretiones eorum." And again in 13:3 we read: "Et vidi et ecce convolabat ille homo cum nubibus caeli, et ubi vultum suum convertebat ut consideraret tremebant omnia quae sub eo videbantur," (cf. vs. 5ff, vs. 12). Also 13:25, 26: "Interpretationes visionis haec quia vidisti virum ascendentem de corde maris, ipse est quem consuerat altissimus multis temporibus, qui per semetipsum liberabit creaturam suam, et ipse disponet qui derelicti sunt." (Cf. 13:32, 51ff; 14:9)<sup>55</sup>.

Whether the *Apocalypse of Baruch* reflects the conception of a pre-existent Messiah at all, and if so under what form, is not altogether clear. Charles thinks that it does, on the basis of 30:1: "And it will come to pass after these things when the time of the advent of the Messiah is fulfilled he will return in glory, then all who have fallen asleep in hope (of him) will rise again." It must be said however that the evidence is not very much in its favor. (cf. 7:22; 29:3; 39:7). But in any event a certain mysteriousness seems to surround the advent of the Messiah.

In the second century this view is taken for granted in Justin's Dialogue with Trypho. Thus in chapter 8, Trypho states that the Messiah is to be born among men, but will be concealed and remain unconscious of his messiahship until he is anointed by Elijah and made manifest to all<sup>56</sup>. (cf. chap. 44, but see chap. 49).

It thus appears that the Messiah was not uniformly conceived during this period. The popular conception we are not able accurately to determine, but so far as it is given to us by implication, it seems closest to the conception reflected in the *Psalms of Solomon*, the gospels and possibly the *Apocalypse of Baruch*. Although the Messiah is of the seed of David and thereby arises out of the community itself, it is the uniform testimony of all the available evidence that to him are attributed certain characteristics which ally him with the superhuman and supernatural. Just how widespread was the conception which appears in the book of *Enoch* and the IV *Ezra* we are unable to say. At any rate we are warranted in saying that in at least some circles of Judaism the Messiah was conceived as a pre-existent heavenly being. The same circle who thus conceived him, also thought of him as existing in the likeness of a man differing principally in the majesty and glory of his ap-

<sup>55</sup>Cf. *Sib. Orac.* V. 256 (Terry's tr. 346), V. 414 (Terry's tr. 556). See Schürer, 3rd ed. III., pp. 442, 443.

<sup>56</sup>The same view was common also in later Judaism. The Targum on Micah 4:8 says that the Messiah will be born at Jerusalem or Bethlehem and will be caught up (to heaven) until the time of his appearance. See EDERSHEIM, *Life and Times*, Vol. I., p. 171ff; BALDENSPERGER, *Selbstbewusstsein Jesu* I, pp. 138-42.

pearance<sup>57</sup>. It goes without saying that his prerogatives were considered to be of divine origin and character. He was in the form of God, lived under the same conditions, and was his deputy with almost unlimited dignity and authority.

In developing his Christology then Paul had ample warrant in Judaism for his doctrine of pre-existence and without question it exercised its influence upon him<sup>58</sup>. It is at the very least more than possible, that Paul even in his pre-Christian life held to the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Messiah. This has in its support the positive evidence that in so many respects he shows kinship with the best apocalyptic thought.

- The doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ was more, however, than a simple attributing to him by Paul the Christian thinker, the qualities of the Messiah of Saul the Pharisee and student of Rabbinic theology. It was not a simple inference from a formal acceptance of Jesus as the Christ. A very essential element was that experience of Paul which led him not only to the initial acceptance of Jesus' messiahship, but also to place him at the right hand of God.

As the exalted Lord of glory Jesus had appeared to Paul (Gal. 1:16; I Cor. 9:1; 15:8; II Cor. 4:6), and as such he was the image of God, for in his appearance was given to Paul the light which proceeds from the knowledge of God as it shines in and through the face of Jesus Christ (II Cor. 4:4-6). The Lord whom he had seen in the vision of light on the road to Damascus was the expression and the revelation of the God whom he had not seen and who dwelt in light unapproachable. It is thus the exalted Christ who forms the center of Paul's vision and the point of departure for his Christological doctrine. He went from that back through the humiliation of the earthly life to the pre-existent Christ. It is one and the same person whether pre-existent, historical or exalted, but it is the latter phase of existence which forms the immediate object of his knowledge and his experience. He knew Christ as the Son of God with power (Rom. 1:4) the Lord of glory

---

<sup>57</sup>In addition to the references cited above, see BOUSSET, *op. cit.* p. 218; BALDENSFERGER, *op. cit.* pp. 104ff; PORTER, *Art. Revelation Book of, Hastings Dict.*, Vol. IV., pp. 255ff; BARTON, *op. cit.* pp. 78-91, *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 776-801. Eschatological questions were a matter of debate between the schools of Hillel and Shammai, particularly as regards resurrection and future reward. See BACHER, *Die Agada der Tannaiten*, Vol. I., pp. 15-16.

<sup>58</sup>The question of whether this doctrine was developed wholly within Judaism or was due, as Gunkel, Bousset and others think, to foreign influence, does not call for consideration. However it arose, it had become thoroughly domesticated in Judaism by Paul's time and it was in this form that it came to him.

(I Cor. 2:8) the heavenly one (I Cor. 15:47-49). As he knew Christ then, he belonged essentially to the heavenly world. And it was this high conception of Christ as the image of God and the mediator of the new life to men that formed the essential element in Paul's Christology. In the light of his conception of the heavenly world as the eternal world, in the contrast of which with this world the space element was quite as prominent as the time element, and particularly in the light of the well known conception of the pre-existence of the Messiah at least in Apocalyptic circles, the development of the conception of Christ's existence previous to his coming to earth is amply accounted for<sup>59</sup>.

Two points seem to call for a remark here. The first concerns itself with the manner of the advent of the Messiah. Paul of course held to the natural birth of Jesus from the seed of David (Rom. 1:3; 9:5; Gal. 4:4; cf. Phil. 2:7). Now it is said by Dalman (*op. cit.*, p. 131) that Judaism never knew anything of a Messiah pre-existent "before birth as a human being." He is, he says, "to make his appearance as a fully developed personality." If this be true Paul would seem in this point, then, to be leaning on some outside support. It should be noticed, however: (1) That Dalman's remark, although generally speaking justified, needs a slight qualification. The conception which we have above seen was not uncommon concerning the Messiah (as in the Gospel of John, Revelation 12:1-6, Trypho and the Targums) in which he is hidden (in heaven?) for a time after birth and then comes to men suddenly and mysteriously, is evidently an effort to combine the elements of pre-existence and of natural birth in the one person, the Messiah<sup>60</sup>. (2) The *Apocalypse of Ezra*, 12:32, combines the conception of the pre-existence of the Messiah with that of his origin from the house of David (cf. p. 59f). In this writing such scholars as Gunkel, Schürer and Porter fail to see any direct Christian influence. If they are correct and we are not to regard this as a Christian interpolation it is the effort of a Jew in approximately the period in which Paul wrote. Charles and Edersheim think the book shows direct Christian influence and I have never been able to persuade myself that such is not the correct view. This point cannot therefore be pressed. (3) Paul himself lays no stress on

---

<sup>59</sup>The doctrine of pre-existence as the Jew conceived it, leaves unanswered the question of ultimate origin. Pre-existence simply means existence in the heavenly world previous to appearance on earth. Paul of course is somewhat more explicit.

<sup>60</sup>Incidentally this strengthens also the argument above against the currency of the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls. Had such a doctrine been current it would obviously have been unnecessary to resort to this extremely unnatural method of combination.

the point. In only one passage (Gal. 4:4) is there certainly a combination of the two elements, pre-existence and birth, and even there only the latter is at all prominent. The doctrine of the virgin birth has left no trace on his thought at any point. In the classic passage for pre-existence and incarnation the idea of birth seems to be quite out of mind and the conditions of Christ's public life only, to be made prominent<sup>61</sup>. (4) The Greek conception no more than the Jewish included the idea of birth when a pre-existent being assumed a temporal earthly existence. Perhaps it even more clearly excluded it. We gain nothing by assuming a Greek influence upon Paul. His statements are accounted for by the historical facts of his Jewish education and Christian experience quite as fully as by an appeal to Greek thought, and more naturally.

The second point concerns the meaning for the pre-existent one of the assumption of temporal existence, the change involved. There is no possible question that Paul connected with Christ's coming to earth the deepest humiliation. This is expressed unequivocally in I Cor. 8:6; Phil. 2:5-8 and is clearly implied also in other passages (cf. above). Now it is perfectly apparent that in developing this conception the apostle is leaving Jewish soil. So far as I know there is not a hint that during this period the advent of the Messiah was conceived in Judaism as attended in any sense by humiliation. (The admission of Trypho, chaps, 68, 69, 90, cannot be taken too seriously). If there is one thing clear, it is that the suffering of Jesus ran diametrically counter to the notion of every Jew concerning the Messiah. He was to come in glory and terrific judgment, and that by a revelation or manifestation. It involved merely a change of the place of operation, and nothing more.

Harnack (*History of Dogma*, I, pp. 318-32) regards Paul's doctrine as a long step toward the Greek conception (cf. BALDENSPERGEN, *op. cit.*, p. 149ff). Concerning this it may be said, (1) The great humiliation of Christ Paul conceived as connected with and consisting in his death. He humbled himself even to the death of the cross and it was for this reason that God gave him the name above every name (Phil. 2:9; Rom. 5:18, 19). This one fact constitutes almost the whole historical significance of Jesus for Paul. The citation of particular passages would be superfluous. (2) Apparently, however, Paul goes beyond this in making the incarnation itself a humiliation. Thus Christ came in the likeness of the flesh of sin (Rom. 8:3); though rich he became poor (II Cor. 8:9) and

<sup>61</sup>It is sometimes said (e. g. HARNACK, *History of Dogma*, I, p. 105, note 2) that the doctrine of pre-existence and of birth, virgin or natural, are contradictory. It certainly was not so considered by the Fathers, possibly even as early as Ignatius. See HOBEN, *The Virgin Birth*.

he emptied himself (Phil. 2:5f). Now on the first passage it should be noticed that the condemnation of sin in the flesh is associated in the verse and is really the prominent thought, this being clear not only from the context but also from the verb forms used. From 6:6ff, cf. 3:24, 25, and other passages this condemnation is seen to occur by the death and not the life of Christ. So that here again the passage reflects a humiliation which if connected with the taking of flesh at all is seen to be so in the light of the result and as the apostle viewed it the purpose of that assumption of flesh. The conception of Christ becoming poor evidently makes prominent not so much the actual experience of Christ in his historical life as the deprivation he suffered in contrast with his previous condition of riches. Thus it is not a positive assumption of that which is defiling and humiliating, but a self abnegation and deprivation of that previously enjoyed upon which the apostle insists<sup>82</sup>. Likewise the emptying of himself and taking the form of a servant, brings into prominence not the positively humiliating character of the present but the loss of that previously possessed and enjoyed. This also receives color from the connection. So that at no time does Paul speak of the humiliation of Christ except either with the thought of his death or with the conception of his pre-existent state in mind. The effort to make Paul Greek here involves then, (1) a too narrow view of the passages and (2) a misinterpretation of Paul's antithesis of flesh and spirit. This latter is an ethical not a psychological contrast. The antithesis is predominantly between the flesh and the spirit of God (not man, see esp. Gal 5:16-26; Rom. 8:5) and fundamentally is not Greek at all<sup>83</sup>.

In discussing the doctrine of pre-existence above it was mentioned that in I Cor. 8:6 and 10:4 is reflected the mediatorial creatorship of Christ. That topic is however important enough for separate discussion and to that we must now turn.

---

<sup>82</sup>The poverty of Christ means our riches. Thus again, his death must color the conception, for it is not Paul's thought that Christ effected good for us except through death.

<sup>83</sup>The question whether, unknown to Paul, there really lurks in his view a docetism does not now concern us.

### III.

#### COSMIC FUNCTION.

In the discussion of this phase of the apostle's thought we encounter a problem which has not called for serious attention in the previous discussion. We are here face to face with the question of the sources upon which our discussion is to be based. The sources thus far used are so generally recognized as authentic that it was unnecessary even to refer to the question. But here we find a very different situation.

The cosmic function or significance of Christ is, to be sure, referred to in the sources of which we have already made use and of this we shall take due notice later, but it is only in Colossians and Ephesians that the subject may be said to receive anything approaching a full statement. The authenticity of both of these letters is, however, still seriously questioned by good critical scholars and perhaps few would regard the matter as finally settled. The question is too large for any attempt at a complete study here, and the most that can be done is to justify the use of them and the method which will be pursued in the subsequent discussion.

The situation as respects the two letters is not the same. It is quite uniformly agreed by scholars of all schools that the genuineness of Colossians is attested by very much stronger evidence than can be adduced in favor of Ephesians. So long as the claim of Baur and his followers that the heresy which forms the background of Colossians and the object of its polemic was a fullfledged gnosticism, remained unrefuted, its Pauline authorship could hardly be maintained, for no fullgrown gnostic system was known to have existed before the second century. But this position of Baur has steadily lost ground. Two factors have contributed to this result.

The first is the generally admitted fact that incipient gnosticism is to be recognized as early as the middle of the first Christian century\*. This is granted by Hilgenfeld, Lipsius, and even by Schürer

---

\*The work of FRIEDLANDER, *Der Vorchristliche Jüdische Gnosticismus*, though extravagant in some positions, has shown that Judaism had some sort of gnosticism even in the pre-Christian period.

and Holtzmann, both of whom still deny the authenticity of Colossians. This gnostic thought is seen to afford ample occasion for any antignostic polemic that the letter contains.

The second fact is the recognition on independent grounds that the heresy opposed in the letters is at least not wholly gnostic, but is in some way related to Judaism. Hort has contended that it is wholly Jewish. (See *Jud. Christianity*, p. 116f). Whether its Jewish elements show affinity with Essenism (Lightfoot, B. Weiss) or with Alexandrianism (McGiffert, Von Soden) or with some other contemporary phase of Judaism (Haupt) is in debate, but the central fact is generally admitted<sup>66</sup>.

So far, then, as concerns the heresy which is opposed in this letter, no appeal can be made to it as arguing against Pauline authorship<sup>66</sup>.

The argument drawn from vocabulary and style has been urged by several scholars from Mayerhoff down, but it is very inconclusive. It is quite possible to collect just as striking peculiarities in the epistles generally regarded as authentic. Besides, no one who thinks vigorously can be held to the same form of expression every time he speaks. A man of the vigor and calibre of Paul will not fail to develop new forms of expression and to employ a somewhat different vocabulary as the conditions change to which he must adapt his speech or writing in order to make it effective<sup>67</sup>.

The objection to the authenticity of the epistle drawn from its Christological conception is, as it is frequently urged, a begging of the question. Pfeiderer (*Paulinism*, Eng. tr. Vol. II, pp. 101-11) speaking not only for himself but for others (as e. g. Holtzmann and Schürer) declares that the Christology here not only advances beyond anything else found in Paul, but also rests upon a logos doctrine similar to that found in the fourth gospel and drawn from the Alexandrian philosophy, and on these grounds the authenticity of the letter, he thinks, must be denied.

Now neither of these arguments can properly be used against the genuineness of the epistle. This is not the place to decide concerning the origin of the Christological doctrine (that must be done after the doctrine itself has been examined), but the latter part of the statement involves the clearly unwarranted assumption that the apostle could not possibly himself have come under Alexandrian influence. This Pfeiderer himself does not believe.

<sup>66</sup>It is still denied, e. g., by Juelicher (*Einleitung*, p. 88f), who finds no specific Jewish tinge in the Colossian heresy.

<sup>67</sup>The statement of WEISS, *Genuineness of the Pauline Epistles*, p. 46, that the "conception we form of these (errorists) will determine our answer to the question whether the letter is genuine or not," is, in the light of the present condition of criticism, without sufficient ground.

<sup>68</sup>Cf. ABBOTT, *Int. Crit. Com.*, pp. lii-liv.

The former assertion may be accepted with qualification. It is readily admitted that the Christology of this letter assumes a definiteness and an elaborateness not previously expressed in the Pauline literature. But at the same time it may just as strongly be insisted that the elements of the conception here reflected are all in the previous genuine writings of Paul. If one take the position that the apostle having once given expression to certain statements is incapable of going beyond these under any conditions, nothing remains to be said, except to express dissent. Once grant, however, the Pauline character and origin of Philippians (which is very generally done, even by Holtzmann, Pfleiderer and Schürer) and no strong argument remains against the authenticity of Colossians on the score of its Christology.

Of course it does not follow that a denial of the Christology to the apostle carries with it the refusal to allow to him any development. It may even be allowed that the thought is a natural development of Pauline thought but yet not probable within the limits of his own lifetime. Such may perhaps be the thought of Pfleiderer. But when it is recalled that almost no one (if indeed any one at all) in the early church understood Paul it seems difficult, if not impossible, that any one should have written this genuinely Pauline document except the apostle himself.

The force of this position has gradually made itself felt and there is a growing recognition on the part of critical scholarship that we have here a genuine production of the apostle<sup>68</sup>. In using it then as a source for the exposition of the cosmic function of Christ we not only follow our own firm conviction but have the support also of the vast majority of scholars.

With Ephesians the case is different. The ratio of scholars who defend it to those who deny its authenticity is just about the inverse proportion of the defenders and antagonists of the genuineness of Colossians. Whereas there is great preponderance of scholarship in favor of the latter, Ephesians is wholly rejected by many of the best critical students. It is accepted by Haupt (Meyer) and with reluctance by Moffatt (*op. cit.*, pp. 225-33). McGiffert (*Apostolic Age*, p. 382f) argues for it, as does Bacon (*Introduction*, 117ff), and it is defended with zeal by Abbott (*Int. Crit. Com.*) and Zahn (*Einleitung*, 2 ed. I, p. 348ff). Jülicher (*Einleitung*, pp. 94ff) and

<sup>68</sup>It is so regarded by Harnack, Jülicher, *Einleitung*, pp. 84-91; Abbott, *Int. Crit. Com.*; Von Soden, *Hand Kom.*; Haupt-(Meyer), 1902; Moffatt, *Historical New Testament*, 214-17; Bacon, *Int. to N. T.*, pp. 55-111; McGiffert, *Apostolic Age*, pp. 372f, and many others. Against it are Schürer, Holtzmann, *N. T. Theol.* II.; Pfleiderer, *Urchristentum*, 2 Vol. II.; 210-26. Holtzmann and J. Weiss regard it as containing a nucleus of authentic material much interpolated. So also Von Soden until recently.



Harnack (*Chronologie* 2:1, p. 239f; *History of Dogma* I. p. 96), are unable to decide either for or against it.

That it is closely related to Colossians in style and thought is recognized by all writers and it was this fact which furnished the basis for the well-known theory of Holtzmann. His view has met very little acceptance but the facts which formed the starting point of his work are generally conceded.

The two points which seem to be urged most strongly against the epistle are its advance beyond Colossians as respects (1) the church and (2) its Christology. Now the exalted rank of the church and its intimate relation to Christ is but little beyond the conception implied in such passages as Rom. 12:4, 5 and I Cor. 12:12-27 (cf. I Cor. 10:32; 15:9). Here not only is the unity of the universal church clearly implied but Christ is the indwelling controlling spirit, even as the vital energy of a body. The conception entertained of Christ is not fundamentally beyond that of Colossians and in 1:18, 24 of the latter we have almost the precise language which is used in Ephesians. Even Pfeiderer (*Paulinism*, II, pp. 170-71; *Urchristentum* 2 ed. II, p. 214) sees that their Christology but not necessarily their Christological interest is identical.

When Colossians is accepted as genuine there is really no reason for rejecting Ephesians. This is acknowledged by several scholars (e. g. by McGiffert, Moffatt, Haupt, apparently Harnack and Jülicher), and will probably receive more and more consideration. Though recognizing that the question is still open and that the majority of scholars are opposed, I shall use Ephesians along with Colossians as giving the genuine Pauline Christological development and conceptions. This is the less open to objection since the present task has to do with the Christological material only and that in any case is Pauline and identical with that of Colossians.

As has already been indicated it is generally recognized that in these two epistles Paul, at least in clearness and fulness of statement, goes beyond anything found in his earlier letters. But this will be shown in the exposition below to be amply accounted for. Moreover, when Paul wrote to the Corinthians some of whom had spoken and acted in a depreciatory manner with respect to the message which he had delivered to them, because from a philosophic point of view it was inferior to that of Apollos, he intimated to them that if he had chosen to do so he could have given them a philosophy that would have met all of their demands. He had such a philosophy but with all their boasted speculative powers it was beyond their apprehension and he only used it with those who were wise. This philosophy must have resembled that which he propounds in Colossians and Ephesians for it had to do with Christ as the power (δύναμις) and the wisdom (σοφία) of God. It was

a revelation of the mystery that "hath been hidden, which God fore-ordained before the worlds unto our glory" (I Cor. 2:7; Rom. 16:25-27; cf. Eph. 1:4-12; 3:3ff, 9-11). This mystery was the universal redemption possible to every human being (Rom. 11:30-36; Gal. 3:28; I Cor. 1:24; 3:9ff; cf. Eph. 3:5, 6). That which is hinted at or implied in these numerous passages is simply more explicitly and elaborately stated in the imprisonment epistles.

The two most explicit passages concerning the cosmic function of Christ, that appear in Paul's earlier writings are I Cor. 8:6 and I Cor. 10:4. These may be briefly considered.

In the first of these we have God and Christ associated together and at the same time in contrast with the many so-called heathen gods, whether of earth or heaven. Though they have many gods and many lords there are for the Christians only one God and one Lord. It is worth while to note that it is in a context in which the apostle is explicitly repudiating the polytheistic conceptions of the gentiles, that he associates Christ with God representing the two as together claiming the full and undivided allegiance of those who bear the Christian name. Plainly stating that God is at once the source of all things and the goal, he does not hesitate, but seems to consider it a matter of course, to associate with him Christ; not indeed as either source or goal, but as the agent or mediator<sup>90</sup> of God not only in creation but also in history. This on the face of it seems an advance beyond Rom. 11:36 where God is declared to be not only the primary source and the end or goal of all things, but also the immediate and solitary agent for the accomplishment of all things. The latter, however, is the later writing and difficulty (if such there be) is not to be solved on the supposition of development. It is rather in the light of the context in Romans that the difficulty vanishes.

The πάντα of the present passage is not to be explained as meaning the things of the new creation for that is distinctly excluded by the context. The ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ refers to the mediatorial activity of Christ, not only in originating but also in sustaining the new creation (Gal. 6:15; II Cor. 5:17). The πάντα refers back to the same things that have their origin in God, i. e. to creation. The express mention of the πάντα and the ἡμεῖς in both clauses, and the horizon of the context seem to be a clear indication that the πάντα is intended in its broadest sense. For in the previous verse the apostle has excluded so-called gods and lords

<sup>90</sup>B aeth Epiph 484 read δι' ὧν. In that case Christ would be associated with God as the immediate end of creation and not as agent his mediatorship in the progress of humanity would be implied, but it would not of necessity mean his pre-existence or cosmic activity.

from "heaven and earth." His argument is deficient if by πάντα he refers in either clause merely to the "new creation." It must signify all the things of heaven and earth. This presupposes the pre-existence of Christ which as we have seen is expressed in this same letter, and unequivocally assigns him the activity of agent in creation. This is done too in a casual way not as if broached for the first time, but as if quite a familiar thought to his readers, and a conception generally held by them. It will appear later that this association of the mediatorial activity of Christ in creation with his agency in mediating the new life of the believer which also has its source in God, is not without its significance.

In the second passage, I Cor. 10:4, we have another phase of the mediatorial activity of Christ set forth. The passage is manifestly metaphorical for no one supposes that Paul means in any sense to identify Christ with a rock. Nor can it be held that he means to say that the rock which furnished the gushing living water for the Israelites is simply a *type* of Christ, the source of spiritual life. The language of the apostle here seems reminiscent of at least three different phenomena which appeared in connection with the march of the children of Israel across the desert. The first is the rock from which burst forth the water to quench the parching thirst of the Israelites, to which we have already referred. This underlies his statement concerning the spiritual drink which they had. But he also mentions that they had the same spiritual food which is a clear reminiscence of the manna which fell from heaven for them. And in the third place he suggests that the spiritual rock from which the Israelites drank "was following them." In this it is but natural to see a reference to the pillar of fire by night and the cloud by day which went before them. He then declares that the spiritual rock which was following them and from which they all had spiritual drink was (ἦν not ἔστιν), Christ. Thus Christ is not only clearly implied to have been in existence at that time, but also to have been the true guide and sustainer of the chosen of Jehovah and the mediator to them (and by inference throughout their history) of the same life which he now gives in its fulness.

Thus in this first letter to the Corinthians not only is the pre-existence of Christ entirely presupposed but even his mediatorship in creation is assumed as a familiar thought, and his function as the mediator of true spiritual life to Israel set forth with naturalness and no apparent thought of making a surprising or unusual statement.

One other passage calls for notice at this point. In Romans 8:19-22 we have another phase of the cosmic function of Christ set forth. This time it is directed toward the future instead of the past. According to the apostle the present condition of creation whereby

it is subject to the bondage of vanity, i. e. imperfection (cf. SANDAY-HEADLAM, *ad loc.*) and corruption, exists by reason of the decree of God<sup>70</sup>. But this present condition is not final. On the contrary it was decreed with the express hope that this same creation should ultimately be freed from this bondage of corruption and reach its consummation along with the "children of God." The explicit manner in which the Apostle refers to the "children of God" in addition to the "whole creation" is sufficient to show that by the latter he does not mean simply mankind. He rather has in mind the whole of the lower creation, both animate and inanimate. It is a well-known fact (οἶδαμεν γὰρ he says, that this creation is groaning and travailing together and that it is expecting and yearning for its consummation. This it shall receive in connection with the consummation of those who have the first fruits of the Spirit, when they receive their adoption, i. e. a new and glorious body, and enter upon the enjoyment of the blessings of the kingdom of God. According to this then, the consummation of the whole creation not only as a matter of fact is, but what is more, was from the beginning in the purpose of God, bound up with the work of Christ. He is not only the redeemer of the children of God but is as well the effective agent of a cosmic redemption and consummation. With this may properly be associated those passages in which Christ is said to be able to bring all things in subjection unto himself (I Cor. 15:24-8; Phil. 2:10; 3:21) and to be the judge of the final destiny of men (II Cor. 5:10; Rom. 2:16).

Thus in the letters concerning whose genuineness no rational doubt exists we have Christ set forth, as (1) the mediator of creation in the beginning; (2) the mediator in sustaining and illuminating at least Israel during its early (and by implication entire) history; (3) as the judge of the final destinies of man, and (4) the Lord of the whole creation and the agent of its final redemption. In more general terms, Christ is conceived by the apostle as the mediator between God and the world as respects its origin, its history and its destiny.

From this ground we may pass to the consideration of the cosmic function of Christ as set forth in Colossians and Ephesians. Our discussion may be conveniently grouped around the three principal points to which Pfeiderer and Holtzmann raise objection as un-Pauline. These are the (1) statement in Col. 1:16 that unto him were all things created; (2) that in him all things consist (1:17); and (3) the metaphysical relation of Christ involved in 1:15-17. These are closely related to the features which we have

<sup>70</sup>According to *Jubilees* 3:28, this involved loss of the power of speech by all the lower animals. Cf. JOSEPHUS, *Antiq.* I., 1, 4 (Niese I., 41, 50), *Secrets of Enoch*, chap. 50.

above discovered in the earlier epistles and our discussion will not only comprise an exposition of the thought in the present letters but also a comparison of it with the apostle's previous thought.

It seems clear that Paul elevates Christ to a position which is above anything which he has previously stated, for his pre-eminence is not only for the present age but also for the age to come (Col. 1:19; 2:9ff; 3:34; Eph. 1:20; 1:23; 4:10. Cf. Phil. 2:10, 11; Col. 3:10, 11). This seems on the face of it to be contrary to the clear subordination of the Son which Paul has expressed in previous epistles (I Cor. 11:3; 15:24-28; Rom. 11:36) as respects the present as well as the future. As respects the present, Paul's previous assertions have proclaimed the pre-eminence and the lordship of Christ, but that lordship was to end with the present age. At the end of that time he was to lay aside his authority and become subject to him who had in the present age subjected all things unto Christ. In the present epistles, however, Christ apparently is to be associated with God in the rule of the future kingdom (Eph. 5:5. Cf. references above).

With regard to this there are two things to be said. First, that the thought which Paul develops here must be viewed in light of the background against which it is projected. The readers of the Colossian letter were attempting to interject a whole series of angelic beings between God and man, and it is Paul's intention to show them that mediation between God and man was effected through not many but one and that one was Christ. It is thus incumbent upon him not only to bring Christ into relation with the church, but also to exalt him to a point which left no room for an intermediary between him and God. This is expressed in its most explicit form in the declaration that in Christ the entire fulness dwells (Col. 1:19; 2:9ff; cf. Eph. 1:23), where the context makes it clear that the thought is not ontological but dynamic. This is only an elaboration of the thought contained in I Cor. 15:24; Rom. 8:38, 39, and Phil. 2:9-11, in which Christ's lordship is clearly of a cosmic character. His independent lordship is verbally set forth also in Phil. 2:10; 3:21; I Cor. 15:24, 25, where it is said that he is able to subject all things unto himself. His active participation in the affairs of God appears also where he is set forth as the judge (II Cor. 5:10; Rom. 2:16). Whatever may be the exact interpretation of Romans 9:5 it probably says at least that Christ is "over all," and certainly little more can be said. (See SANDAY-HEADLAM, pp. 233-38 for good discussion and citation of literature. Cf. BURKITT, *Journal of Theological Studies*, April 1904, p. 451f).

Secondly, it should be noted however that this supreme exaltation of Christ is at the same time connected with what must clearly be a true subordination to God. Not only is God the God and Father

of Christ (Col. 1:3, 13; 2:2; Eph. 1:3, 17; 3:14), but all that which Christ effects is either explicitly affirmed or clearly implied to have been wrought by him as the medium or agent through whom God works. (Eph. 1:5ff; 1:7, 10; Cf. 4:15, 16, 32; Col. 1:1, 11, 13ff). Although he is said to be the end of creation (εἰς αὐτὸν ἐκτίσται) it must unquestionably be understood in a secondary sense. In the same sentence it is clearly implied that he is not the source but only the agent of creation. In consequence of course its source and actual origin was in God. If Christ is the end of creation it is because he was so appointed by God who as its source is also of necessity the determinator of its goal. Cf. on Rom. 8:19-22, p. 70f. And more exactly God is declared to be all in all (Eph. 2:4ff; 3:20; 4:6). Not only does he work all things according to the council of his own will (Eph. 1:9, 11) that is, according to his own all-sufficient, eternal purpose, but as the God of Christ, himself effected all things by his own power (1:17). Even Christ occupies his present position as lord over all because the power of God operated to raise him from the dead and to place him at his own right hand (Eph. 1:17, 20; Col. 3:1; cf. Phil. 2:9ff; Rom. 8:34). The very fact that God has placed Jesus at his right hand indicates that God himself still occupies the throne and Jesus, however highly exalted, is yet subordinate to him. Since God is himself all in all, the source, the effective power, and also the end of all things, it is only in a relative sense (that is, as compared with the hypothetical intermediaries of the Colossian heresy, and not with God) that Christ is himself said to be all in all. The fact is, in his earlier writings Paul ascribes the same authority interchangeably to God or to Christ his representative (e. g. Rom. 8:35; cf. 8:39). It seems clear, then, that while Paul in these epistles makes declarations concerning the cosmical significance of Christ which are both more explicit and more elaborate than anything announced in his previous writings, the place to which he really assigns him does not essentially differ from that which he occupies in his previous thought. This is not to say that Paul shows no development in his Christological thinking, but rather that the conditions which called for the epistle at all, furnished the occasion for the clear expression of that which his previous thought contained in *embryo*.

As to the statement in Col. (1:17), that in Christ all things consist, Pfeiderer urges that Christ is here virtually made a cosmical principle quite contrary to all of Paul's previous thought and clearly dependent upon Alexandrian logos philosophy. Lightfoot and Abbott agree that in this statement there is a reflection of the logos doctrine, and Von Soden thinks that it is to be rejected as un-Pauline. It may, however, well be questioned whether this is a true interpretation of the apostle's thought. In verse 15 Paul has stated

that in him were all things created, and this he explains in verse 16 by the double expression that through him ( $\delta\iota' \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ ) and unto him ( $\epsilon\iota\varsigma \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$ ) were all things created (cf. Thayer on  $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ , I, 6, c). The thought is not that all things separately are created through him and for him, but that all things together or as a whole. The  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha$  is inclusive rather than distributive. This seventeenth verse is not a simple restatement of the place of Christ in original creation but gives an additional thought. Just as he was the agent and the end (in the way already explained) of creation as an initial act, so it is by him not as a cosmical principle but as a person that creation as a present system is upheld. The previous statement was intended to set forth his superiority to the world in its beginning, but as Haupt remarks he might still be regarded as subordinate if he were not concerned in the operation and progress of the world at present. This statement consequently is intended to set forth his present superiority and lordship over the world as he is the one through whom and in whom it has coherence as a cosmos. As he is the head of the church and gives unity and life to it, so he is the unifier and the sustainer of the world. Thus in all things not only in a cosmical but in a spiritual sense does he have pre-eminence (Col. 1:18). This relates itself to the previously expressed thought of the lordship of Christ. If he is Lord of all (I Cor. 15:24, 25; Phil. 2:11; 3:21) even of the entire cosmos, then not only its existence but its direction is dependent upon him.

As a part of this pre-eminence it was the good pleasure of God to make him the mediator, the reconciler of all things unto himself (Col. 1:20; cf. Eph. 1:10). This has already been implied in I Cor. 15:24-28, for the son reigns only till he has abolished "all rule and authority and power" ( $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\acute{\eta}\nu \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\varsigma \epsilon\acute{\xi}\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\upsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \delta\acute{\upsilon}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\upsilon$ ) when he delivers the kingdom ( $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha\upsilon$ ) to God, who has really accomplished the subjection through the agency of Christ. More explicitly is it set forth in Phil. 2:10, 11, for on what does the reconciliation depend except the recognition of the lordship of Jesus Christ (I Cor. 12:3; cf. II Cor. 5:18, 19; Rom. 5:10; Col. 3:3, 4).

The third point which we have to consider is the metaphysical relation which Christ bears to God. In speaking of Christ as the image of God and the first-born of all creation there is reflected, Holtzmann and Pfeiderer think, the notion of the pre-existent divine logos, which is all the more apparent since the term invisible ( $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\upsilon$ ) is applied to God in true Alexandrian fashion.

The statement concerning  $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\upsilon$  may be dismissed at once. It is no doubt true that the invisibility of God was a dogma of Alexandrian thought, but it is no less true that it was a common conception of Palestinian theology (cf. above, pp. 45-47). It cannot,

then, be used as an argument on either side, and the decision must rest upon other evidence. Fortunately this is at hand.

As respects the notion of pre-existence it must be noticed that the point of view from which Paul regards Christ is as the exalted one and not the pre-existent one. The whole conception in these epistles is based on the apostle's knowledge of the exalted Christ and all that Paul has to say is said in view of this experience of the exalted one. In speaking of Christ as the image of God he clearly has in mind the same thought he has expressed in II Cor. 4:4-6, a thought related to that in II Cor. 3:18; Rom. 8:29; Phil. 3:21; cf. 2:5-11. That the passage there refers to the risen Christ admits of no sort of question. Moreover Paul can also speak of man not only as the image but as the glory of God (I Cor. 11:7), a passage which compels us to say that the term "image of God" does not in itself carry a metaphysical connotation. In addition to this, Paul speaks of Christ the image of God in the present (ἐστίν) cf. VON SODEN, *in loco*) and constantly uses the present tense in speaking of Christ. His point of view is clearly the Christ seated at the right hand of God and from that exalted position he views him in all of his relations. Not only is this true as respects his earthly life and mission, but also as respects his pre-existent relation to the universe and to God. Furthermore, it is his relation to the universe as that bears upon his practical value for men (Haupt, *in loco*, has a full discussion) and not his relation to God with which Paul is primarily concerned. In the forefront of Paul's thought stands Christ as the mediator, not only of the creation of the world both animate and inanimate and of its present continuance and progress, but of its reconciliation and unification with God. As a reflex of this thought is his relation to God, not considered *per se* but as it affects his value for men. As the image of God he is the one through whom men receive their knowledge of God, and this knowledge comes to men not through the pre-existent but through the exalted Christ (II Cor. 4:4-6). Not even is it through the historical, for the historical Christ himself is and must be viewed in the light of the present Christ exalted to the right hand of God. For Paul this was particularly true and it colored all of his thinking, for the Christ who had given to him the knowledge and manifested the glory of God was not the Jesus who in human likeness walked the hills of Galilee or the streets of Jerusalem, but he who in the body of glory (σῶμα τῆς δόξης Phil. 3:21) appeared to him on the way to Damascus. It is not meant here to deny that Paul's thought goes behind the exalted or even the historical Christ, but only meant to affirm that the former is his starting point.

The pre-existence of Christ is clearly reflected as being involved in his position as agent in the creation of the world (Col. 1:15, 17,



18). This we have already fully shown to be a thought of the earlier letters. Whether he is to be regarded as himself a creature or as outside of creation is a much disputed question. (For a complete discussion of the question see Lightfoot, Abbott and Haupt *in loco*). Haupt holds that "first-born" (πρωτότοκος) in Col. 1:15 is to be taken not as indicating priority in time, but as superiority in rank, in which case the genitive (πάσης κτίσεως) may be conceived either as a partitive or as a genitive of relation. In the former case the absence of the article creates some difficulty, but apparently not an insuperable one (cf. Win.-Schm. sec. 19, 2b). If taken as a genitive of relation (a genitive of comparison) he would explain the πρωτο in πρωτότοκος in the same sense as John 1:15, as the one who is unconditionally higher than all creatures. In either case the genitive accords well with the meaning which he finds in the term πρωτότοκος as denoting Christ's superiority over creation. Lightfoot gives the first place to the idea of priority to all creation which phase of thought connects it, he thinks, with Alexandrian philosophy in declaring "the absolute pre-existence of the son." With this he includes the thought which Haupt emphasizes, viz., sovereignty over all creation, thus connecting it with the Palestinian conception that "the right of primogeniture appertains to Messiah over all created things." Abbott agrees with Lightfoot that the word contains the idea of the priority of Christ to, and his distinction from, every created thing. He disagrees with Lightfoot in respect to sovereignty over creation, the idea upon which Haupt lays all the stress, and thinks that the passages cited will not justify the inclusion of this thought as a part of the meaning this interpretation.

It seems clear that the term πρωτότοκος does not in Paul elsewhere convey the idea of superiority but of priority, as even the passage in Col. 1:18 has primarily the latter meaning; for the ἀρχή is apparently a partial explanation of the following words, (cf. I Cor. 15:20, 23). Nor does it bear a meaning other than that of priority in the New Testament writings (Luke 2:7; Rom. 8:29; Heb. 11:28; Rev. 1:5), except in Heb. 1:6 and 12:23 where it is probably a title of the Messiah. In the *Psalms of Solomon* 13:8 and 18:4 on the other hand πρωτότοκος is used to express the idea that the one so designated is the object of supreme affection. 13:8. *ὅτι νουθετήσῃ δίκαιον ὡς υἱὸν ἀγαπήσεις καὶ ἡ παιδεία αὐτοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου.* 18:4. *ἡ ἀγάπη σου ἐπὶ στέρμα Ἀβραὰμ, υἱὸς Ἰσραὴλ, ἡ παιδεία σου ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ὡς υἱὸν πρωτοτόκον μονογενῆ* A similar thought is found in *Sirach* 36:12; Ex. 4:22; and Zach. 12:10. This seems a well established usage and it is worth while to notice that in the preceding verse Paul has spoken of Christ as

the son of his (God's) love τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἀγάπης αὐτοῦ cf. esp. *Psalms of Solomon* 13:8). It is pertinent to inquire then whether the apostle does not use the term in that sense and with particular reference, as verse 13 indicates, to the exalted Christ. But this probably does not exhaust the thought. Now there can be no shadow of doubt that in Psalm 89:28 the primary emphasis in πρωτότοκον is upon the idea of superiority, pre-eminence. It may also be taken as well established that this rests not in any wise upon the origin of the ideal king but is a free choice of Jehovah. The basis of pre-eminence is rather then the supreme affection of Jehovah for the one chosen. So in the present passage. The one thing upon which the apostle is laying emphasis throughout the entire passage (and even the epistle) is the pre-eminence of Christ. (See esp. vs. 18.) I think me must say then that the term πρωτότοκος includes (1) first the idea of pre-eminence and (2) the idea of supreme affection as the basis of this pre-eminence. Christ is as the "first-born," the "heir to the throne" and the object of the Father's love. (Cf. John 1:14; 3:16). A metaphysical relation is not then reflected here at all. This is not to deny that Paul conceived such a relation for Christ, but only that he does not express it in these terms.

If our exposition of the apostle's thought in these two epistles is approximately correct, it does not differ in any essential feature from that which is either expressed or implied in various passages of the earlier and unquestionably authentic letters. As a matter of fact the pre-existent relations of Christ are less elaborately exhibited than in the earlier letters. It is the exalted Christ (neither the historical nor pre-existent one) that fills the circle of the apostle's vision, and it is his significance for the destiny of men, the church and the whole creation which he is concerned to set forth. This he does with an elaborateness and a precision with which he has not done it before. The ample explanation of this lies in the conditions in the Colossian church which he desires to correct, and for the Ephesian letter in the fact that it was written at so nearly the same time, and was presumably intended as a prophylactic against the rise of conditions like those reflected in Colossians.

We thus find that Paul's conception of the cosmic function of Christ is essentially identical in the second and third groups of his letters<sup>71</sup>. There is a certain amount of development due to specific local conditions, but the view is essentially one. We have now to ask concerning the origin of this conception.

---

<sup>71</sup>It is inaccurate then to speak as if Paul's Christology shows kinship to the logos doctrine first in Colossians and Ephesians. It really shows no more here than in Corinthians and Romans.

In seeking an answer to this question it is necessary that we get as nearly as possible the point of view of the apostle himself. In what way did he come into his knowledge of Christ, and from what point did his thought begin and develop? As to this question there can be but one answer. As has been already indicated more than once, it was the risen and exalted Savior and Christ who was the beginning and the center of the apostle's thought. The chief problem with which Saul, the Pharisee, had to deal and for which he sought an answer was how he might attain to the righteousness which would make him acceptable to God. According to his own testimony (see especially Rom. chap. 7; Gal. 2:19) he had found this to be impossible through his own effort. It was by the risen Christ who appeared to him on the way to Damascus and who had become to him the mediator of the new life of the spirit that this yearning of his soul had been accomplished. This had been done not by the teaching of the historical Jesus, but by the death and resurrection of that Jesus, the son of God. While this work of Christ had thus its beginning in the past, its consummation lay in the future. And that with which Paul was most concerned was the consummation of that which he had already begun to realize through the earnest of the spirit (II Cor. 1:22; 5:5; Eph. 1:14). It is thus the work of Christ which Paul exhibits with so much fulness and clearness. The questions concerning his person and his metaphysical relation to God are to him, at least in his extant writings, matters of secondary moment. That he held perhaps a well unified system of thought as to this general problem the letters seem to indicate, but he nowhere attempts a discussion of this as a primary matter. The classic passage for the discovery of his thought in this particular is manifestly written for a purely practical purpose, and the reference to the more theoretical or speculative questions is merely contributory to the end he has in view. As we have already expressed it, he is concerned with Christ as the mediator between God and the world as respects its beginning, its history (in part at least), and its consummation. What we have just been saying is to the effect that it was the latter phase of the subject which formed the center of his thought. The significance of Christ for the future of mankind and of the world in general, is that which we find most clearly set forth in his writings and which evidently occupied the largest place in his thought.

We ask then, in the first place, for the origin of this phase of his general conception of Christ as the mediator between God and the world.

When we turn to Alexandrian Judaism we find such a conception conspicuous for its absence. Clearly the origin of the Pauline conception is not to be sought here. This appears for three reasons.

In the first place, Alexandrian writers do not reflect such a conception. In the *Sibylline Oracles* III 954ff (Geffcken 767ff) the future, as this writer conceives it, involves only a return to Jerusalem of those who are scattered abroad; the bringing of gifts to the temple by various subjugated peoples; and things pleasant in the land even to the changing of the face of nature. But that this involves a general cosmic renewal is not even so much as hinted. In IV 234ff<sup>72</sup> (Geffcken 181ff) we have much the same conception.

In Philo, we have the fullest expression of thought along this line in *de execratione* 8 and 9, but here again nothing more seems involved in his hope for the future than a restoration of the dispersion (if they repent and turn to God), a rehabilitation of the nation, cities rebuilt, barren land reclaimed and made fertile and everything pleasant and joyous. A somewhat more elaborate description is given in *de praem. et poen.* 15-20, but it is not so definite. In *de execratione* 6 he sets forth his belief that the good will have a sure habitation in heaven, which because of its glory cannot be described. And in this same passage and in *de cherub.* I, 3, he speaks of the eternal punishment which the wicked shall receive, mentioning expressly that they shall be dragged down to the very lowest depths and "hurled to Tartarus and profound darkness." But with this whole circle of thought Philo combines his peculiar allegorical methods and conceptions in such a way as to render it rather difficult to say precisely what that conception was. It seems quite justifiable to say, however, that there is no evidence that this was conceived in anything approaching a cosmic sense. In the *Secrets of Enoch*, likewise, no such conception appears, nor do we find it in the *Wisdom of Solomon*.

In the second place, the Messiah played a scant role in Hellenistic Judaism. He does not appear at all in the *Sibylline Oracles*, the *Wisdom of Solomon* or the *Secrets of Enoch*. In Philo he is spoken of in a somewhat vague manner, but apparently is some ordinary person chosen as leader of the restored Israel, whose work is mainly that of a temporal ruler and has no significance except for the nation in a positive way and negatively for its enemies. Charles' remark (*Hast. Dict.* Vol. I, 746a) that "the inclusion of the Messiah and the Messianic kingdom in Philo's eschatology, though really foreign to his system, is strong evidence as to the prevalence of these expectations even in Hellenistic Judaism" seems to rest on too slender support. When the doctrine of a Messiah is found only in one writing of Hellenistic Judaism (and really means little here) and is absent in three others in which if held it certainly would have been included, this would seem to indicate that it was not so common a conception as Charles intimates.

<sup>72</sup>This book was probably written by a Jew during the last quarter of the first Christian century.

The evidence rather tends to show that the messianic hope of Hellenistic Judaism was largely centered round the thought of a restoration to the Holy Land, purged and purified from its enemies and oppressors.

In the third place, this phase of the conception does not connect itself with the *logos* doctrine of Philo and other writers. For the *logos* was a mediator between God and the world as respects the past and the present, but it was connected with no hope centered about the future.

In Palestinian Judaism we find a different condition. The idea of a final renewal of creation involving not only the destiny of humanity but the lower orders of creation as well is a familiar one in Jewish literature. It can be traced easily as far back as the second Isaiah (65:17; 66:22) and is incipient also in portions of the first Isaiah (see e. g. 4:2-6; 11:6-9).

In the literature of later Judaism we find the conception first explicitly set forth in the *Book of Jubilees*. Thus in 1:29 we read "...from the day of the new creation when the heavens and the earth shall be renewed and all their creation according to the power of heaven and according to all the creation of the earth until the sanctuary of the Lord shall be made in Jerusalem on Mount Zion." (Cf. 1:26; 4:26; see CHARLES, *Book of Jubilees*, p. 10, note). Again in the *Book of Enoch*, 44:4, 5 we read, "And on that day I will cause mine elect one to dwell among them, and I will transform the heaven and make it an eternal blessing and light, and I will transform the earth and make it a blessing and cause mine elect ones to dwell upon it;" Cf. also 51:1ff; 72:1; 91:15, 16. It may be noticed in passing that we have here this "new creation" or the renewal of the heaven and the earth connected with the day of Jehovah and the triumph of the Messiah.

In the *Assumption of Moses*, 10:1 we read, "Then will his kingdom appear throughout all creation, etc." This passage may have underlying it the thought of the renewal of creation but about that we cannot be positive, and do not insist upon it as a witness to the currency of the conception.

When we pass to the *Apocalypse of Baruch* we find the conception explicitly set forth. Thus in 32:6 (cf. 31:5; 32:5) "For there will be a greater trial than these two tribulations, when the Mighty One will renew his creation." And again in 57:2 "Because at that time the unwritten law was named amongst them and the works of the commandments were then fulfilled, and belief in the coming judgment was then generated and hope of the world that was to be renewed was then built up and the promise of the life that should come hereafter was then implanted." Cf. 44:8-12. In 73:1-74:2 this renewal is expressly connected with the triumph of the Messiah (Cf. also Charles, on 57:2). The same conception is reflected also

in IV *Ezra*, 7:75, "O Lord show this also unto thy servant, whether after death even now when every one of us giveth up his soul, we shall be kept in rest until those times come in which thou shalt renew the creation."

Not only was this a common conception of Judaism but was taken over directly by the primitive church. Thus in Matt. 19:28 the regeneration is not only taken for granted as a common conception, but is expressly connected with the establishment of the kingdom by the Son of Man.

In the address of Peter to the people in Solomon's porch, as recorded in Acts (3:21) the same conception is referred to in the phrase "restoration of all things" and is apparently taken as an ordinary part of the message of the primitive church. In Revelation 21:1 and II Peter 3:13 "a new heaven and a new earth" are referred to and is a reflection of the same thought.

It is a significant fact that in all of these passages the conception is assumed as generally well known and as a part of the common eschatological expectation. It is everywhere taken for granted that the readers hold the idea as an established certainty. The writers never deem it necessary to undertake an argument to prove its certainty and at least partially assume that it is well known even in its characteristic features. Occasionally they do give a short description of the phenomena which shall accompany or characterize it, but never anything more. There would seem to remain but little doubt that this is the origin of the conception in Paul. He knew it not only as a dogma of Judaism, but as a part of the common Christian expectation as well. This he has indicated in Rom. 8:22 where in referring to it he says that "we know" where "we" can only mean "we Christians."

Not only was this the source of Paul's general expectation of a final consummation in which the creation should again be brought into harmony with God according to its original condition, but also is the warrant for connecting this consummation with the Messiah. We have already seen above that in *Enoch*, in *Baruch*, and in certain New Testament writers the two are brought together. The setting up of the kingdom of the Messiah among men involves also certain transformations in the whole creation which shall bring it into harmony with the new age which is thus begun.

As a part of the same general conception is that also in which the Messiah appears as the judge who acts for God and determines the destiny of men. This conception appears to have been the common one among those who thought of the Messiah as anything more than a mere political leader. It receives classic expression in the *Book of Enoch*, Chaps. 37-70. A passage or two may be quoted. Thus in 45:3 we read "On that day mine Elect One will sit on the

throne of glory and make choice amongst their (men's) deeds, and their mansions will be innumerable and their souls will grow strong within them when they see mine elect ones and those who have called upon thy glorious name." And another 69:27, 29, "And he sat on the throne of his glory, and the sum of judgments was committed unto him, the Son of Man, and he caused the sinners and those who have led the world astray to pass away and be destroyed from off the face of the earth. . . ." "And from henceforth there will be nothing that is corruptible; for the Son of Man has appeared and sits on the throne of his glory and all evil will pass away before his face and depart;" cf. also 55:4; 62:3, 5; 61:8; 62:2; see also 47:3 and 51:3. This conception is attested also in the apocalypse of Mark, chap. 13, and parallels and in the early chapters of Acts.

There seems no room to doubt then that so far as elements external to his own experience were contributory to Paul's conception of Christ as the agent of God in the final renewal of the cosmos and its unification and reconciliation with himself (i. e. God), they were drawn directly from Palestinian Jewish thought and from the conception of the early church.

Supporting this also was the apostle's own experience. As he knew Christ to be the mediator of the life of the spirit of God to himself at the present, the one through whom he had come into the knowledge of God, and was persuaded that even now he was at the right hand of God it was natural that he should make him the mediator of all that which in the future he hoped to receive from God. The formal *schema* of his thought for the future was given to him by Judaism. The conception of the Messiah as the judge and vicegerent of God he knew almost certainly as likewise current in Judaism. The elevation of Jesus to that office and those prerogatives was due to his identification of Jesus as the Christ, and to his experience of the blessing mediated to him through that same Christ. The form of his expectation was that of Judaism, the content of his hope grew out of his own experience.

We have next to inquire for the origin of the apostle's conception of Christ as the mediator in his pre-existent state, according to which it will be recalled he was conceived as the dispenser, to Israel at least, of spiritual life and light. It is important for us to remember again that it was the exalted heavenly Christ whom Paul knew as the dispenser of life and light to himself and to the church; that the center of his whole conception was the Christ of the heavenly world who had manifested himself to Paul and shown him the glory of the invisible God, (II Cor. 4:4-6). It has also been shown above that Paul held to the doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ, and that this was in reality an inference of the apostle based on the fact of the existence of Christ after his resurrection as a heavenly

being and his revelation of himself to Paul as such. This fact in the light of the apostle's Jewish conception of the heavenly world and a pre-existent Messiah gave ample ground for his conception of Christ as pre-existent. In addition to this, he also conceived Christ as closely associated with God in the mode and conditions of his existence and in prerogatives. Thus far we have seen that Paul was building directly on his own experience interpreted in the light of the ordinary Jewish conceptions.

When we pass now to the pre-existent Christ as mediator it must be said, I think, that we move out of the field of Palestinian Jewish theology. (But see BALDENSPERGER, *op. cit.*, p. 147f). There is no evidence, of which I am aware, that tends to show that the thought of mediatorship was connected in any way with the conception of the Messiah, even in its highest form. The *Similitudes of Enoch* are the highest and most elaborate expression of the doctrine of Messiah in the whole literature of Judaism. And one seeks in vain, I think, for even a suggestion that the Messiah was as a pre-existent being in any wise a mediator between God and man. He had nothing whatever to do with the course of human history or of human life, but first assumed mediatorial and representative significance at the consummation of the age. In *Enoch* 46:5; cf. 45:3, it is said that "he (the Messiah) will put down the kings from their thrones and kingdoms because they do not extol and praise him nor thankfully acknowledge whence the kingdom was bestowed upon them." But it is very improbable that the Messiah is thought of as in any way the source of their authority. A period previous to the Messianic time seems for the most part not to be included in the circle of the writer's vision.

Nor may the Targumic doctrine of the Memra be appealed to as a background for Paul's conception. It is impossible to prove that the present literary form of this conception (Memra) is older than the third Christian century, nor can its currency in the oral teaching of the Rabbis be shown to have existed in the time of Paul. Besides, there are some indications that this doctrine is itself, in part at least, the result of external influence. The term itself as it appears in the Targum is not consistently used. In many passages the Targum is a faithful and direct translation of the Old Testament and this term is not used at all. In other passages of precisely similar character and import it is used. Such a phenomenon seems most naturally explained upon the supposition that it was not the expression of a doctrine which the Rabbis held but a purely rhetorical expression. The difficulty which they felt was one of literary character and rhetorical form rather than of philosophic significance. This would hardly have been true if the matter had been worked out among them. It has also been argued on other



grounds that this doctrine shows traces of Alexandrian influence<sup>78</sup>.

There is a suggestion that the need for some mediatorial agent between God and man was felt in the Old Testament itself. The semi-personification of the word of the Lord to the prophets, and the personification of wisdom as it appears in Proverbs 8:1ff, 22f; Sirach 1:4, 15; Wisdom 6:16; 7:22ff, 26 reflect this. But in neither of these is there anything like the definite personal conception which Paul has of Christ. It is worth while to notice that one of the fundamental elements in Paul's conception of Christ is that of the σοφία θεοῦ (I Cor. 1:24). The context in which this expression occurs indicates that the conception was one of the fundamental elements of Paul's religious philosophy. It does not seem quite groundless to suppose that this is in some way connected with the doctrine of wisdom as it appears in Jewish literature. But the evidence to support such a supposition is too meager to allow it any large independent weight. There are also some indications that he had in mind a different notion, and one which was prevalent in the Corinthian church itself. The doctrine of angels as the messengers of Jehovah to men is due to the feeling for some necessary mediator between God and man. This is a constant factor in certain parts of later Old Testament thought and is fully developed in the later Jewish literature. The angels are divided into groups and the most prominent of them not only receive names, but are assigned certain definite and constant duties before Jehovah. (See e. g. Dan. 12:1; Enoch 40:2ff et *passim*; Rev. 12:7; cf. Matt. 1:20; 4:11; 13:39; 16:27; 18:10; 24:36; Luke 12:8; John 12:29; Acts 27:23). This conception is strictly personal.

While we must apparently say that Judaism knew nothing of a pre-existent mediatorial activity on the part of the Messiah yet it is equally clear that in the time of Paul the streams were converging in it, which might with tolerable naturalness result in such a conception. One who knew the Jewish feeling of the necessity for some mediator, and at the same time desired to exalt the Messiah to a place of complete and universal pre-eminence would find some warrant at least for so doing. But no adequate explanation can be solely derived in this way.

It should be noticed that in the doctrine of the logos as it appears in Alexandrian thought, and particularly in that of Philo, we have a conception which resembles that of Paul in the particular point now under discussion. But Paul is so close to the Jewish thought in every other phase of the conception up to this point and in general occupies a point of view so far removed from the logos doctrine that one hesitates to find his conception of Christ as

<sup>78</sup>See for a good discussion, HACKSPILL, *Revue Biblique*, Jan., 1902, pp. 58-73. Cf. SIEGFRIED, *Philo von Alexandria*, pp. 281-283.

the mediator of God to the world in his pre-existent state in this Alexandrian doctrine. We have already seen how far apart the two conceptions are as respects the matter of personality. But in addition to this point the *logos* though conceived as the medium of creation and sometimes spoken of as if active in creation, is nevertheless the type according to which God constructs the universe and so far passive. This seems to me Philo's fundamental notion. The statements attributing to it activity are poetic personification. Paul's conception is essentially different. Its origin hardly lies here. It is rather to be found in the natural expansion in the atmosphere in which he lived, of his thought of the mediatorship of Christ. He knew Christ as the present heavenly mediator and held also on independent ground to his previous heavenly existence. The extension of his mediatorship to that pre-existent life, especially with the thought of a mediator for that time familiar, seems then a not unnatural step to take.

The origin of Paul's conception of Christ as the mediator in creation is still to be sought. We have just seen that the growing thought of mediatorship was the explanation of his conception of the pre-existent activity of Christ. There is some evidence that the same conception is to be utilized here. As was remarked above, in the discussion of I Cor. 8:10 the mediatorship of Christ in the new life and in creation were associated together. It seems to be a well warranted inference that they were connected just as closely in the apostle's thinking. This inference is very strongly supported in the only other passage in which Christ is spoken of as the mediator in creation. In Colossians 1:15f we have a rather explicit statement. Here Christ as the goal of creation and as the mediator of its final consummation is very closely associated with Christ as related to creation. In the eighteenth verse his relation to the church is spoken of and in the twentieth verse the significance of his mediatorial death for the final reconciliation of all things unto God is expressly set forth. In Romans 8:19ff it is indicated that the whole history of the cosmos was planned with reference to its final consummation in Christ. According to these passages then, the mediatorial work of Christ is the core of history. The cosmos is at present being brought into subjection to him, and through him shall receive its final consummation. As now the world was planned from the beginning with reference to him and his work, and as he is its present and future Lord the mediator to it of the divine life and purpose, and as he was before his life on earth associated with God, so it follows by a natural inference that he was the mediator of the divine purpose and power in its origin. If our representation be correct then, the cosmic function of Christ may be summed up in the one word mediator. The center of this conception was Paul's

own immediate experience. From that he argued in both directions to the consummation and to the beginning, and assigned to Christ the same relation in respect to both that he knew him to occupy in the church. The cosmos was a unit and the mediatorship of Christ was perfect and comprehensive.

It is to be freely admitted that the logos of Philo is closest to Paul at this point—the pre-existent cosmic activity of Christ. It is possibly true that the Philonic conception may have given Paul a suggestion. But it is more probable that Paul, Philo and John, are all witnesses of the same general tendency in that whole period. It cannot be maintained that Paul is purely Jewish in his thinking. But it does seem to be true that by far the most dominant elements in his Christology outside of his own experience were drawn from Jewish theology. He must have known something of Hellenistic thought, for he could not escape it; but it is surprising how small is its contribution (if we must grant any) to his Christology.

